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1. SUMMARY: Resp was dismissed from medical school. 
Timely 
CA 8 
agreed with her contention that she was entitled to a prior notice 
and hearing. Petr challenges this conclusion where the reasons 
----. 
for dismissal are not released. 
2. FACTS: Resp was admitted with advanced standing during 
the first year of operation of the University of Missouri-Kansas 
- -
- 2 
City (UMKC) School of Medicine in 1971. The curriculum at UMKC 
is designed to train students to become practicing physicians, 
and therefore require that its students become proficient in 
clinical skills. Resp's academic performance apparently was good, 
but her clinical work left the school highly dissatisfied. In 
1972 the faculty members in Pediatrics criticized her "expertise 
in coming to the fundamentals of the clinical program," her lack 
of patient rapport, her erratic attendance, and her poor personal 
\ hygieneo Resp's docent (faculty "advisor") brought these criticisms 
~ 
-• .. j 
-
to her attention. By letter dated July 5, 1972, the Dean told 
resp that although she was being advanced to Year VI, she was on 
------------------ --,--------~----------- -----
probation, and specified the perceived deficiencies. 
In December of 1972, a Council on Evaluation reconsidered 
resp's status and recommended that she not be allowed to graduate 
on schedule. This was approved by the Coordinating Committee and 
the Dean, who wrote resp telling her that she was to be continued 
on probation, would not graduate in spring, and if she did not 
make the necessary improvements, would be terminated after May. 
She was told that she could request a set of oral and practical 
examinations as an "appeal" of the decision not to graduate her in 
the spring of 1973. Resp initiated such a request, which resulted 
in an examination of her by 7 faculty members who had not had 
extensive prior contact with her. Two of them recommended that 





or outright dismissal. The decision not to allow her to graduate 
in June of 1973 was thereafter affirmed. In May, the Council 
on Evaluation considered resp's case again, concluded that she 
had not made sufficient progress in her deficient areas, and it 
was decided she should be dropped. 
Petr filed this suit under§ 1983, alleging, insofar as is 
now relevant, a denial of due process in that the school failed 
to provide her with a notice of the charges and a hearing prior 
to her dismissal. The DC dismissed her suit, and CA 8 reversed, 
holding 
"The unrefuted evidence here establishes that 
Horowitz has been stigmatized by her dismissal 
in such a way that she will be unable to continue 
her medical education, and her chances of returning 
to employment in a medically related field are h 
severely damaged. The dismissal was effected I~'( 
without the hearing required by the fourteenth , 
amendment." (A-8) 
CA 8 distinguished Bishop v. Wood, and Board of Regents v. Roth, 
reading those as cases "in which a damaging stigma was not proved 
or was inadequately alleged." E· , bane was denied by a 5-3 vote. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends, relying on Bishop v. Wood 
and Roth, that a simple dismissal from school for deficiencies in 
:V 
academic performance does not amount to a deprivation of liberty 
~ ~ --= ,,_ 'W-- ,,,,,....,, 
Y I think the characterization of the reasons for the dismissal 
as "adademic performance" is only a partially accurate summary; it 
would seem better, as resp asserts, to characterize her dismissal as 
based in part on academic shortcomings, and in part on non-academic 
personal shortcomingso But, where the only claim found by CA 8 is 
one of due process due t6~stigmatizing dismissal, this distinction 
is largely irrelevant, where the reasons for the dismissal are not made 
public. CA S's opinion was based on the stigmatizing effects of a 
dismissal, not on any asserted right not to be dismissed but for 




requiring due process protections. Petr contends that the essence 
of such a protected deprivation is the release of stigmatizing 
information coupled with future lost opportunities. Here, since 
the school did not release its reasons for dismissing resp, a 
notice and a hearing were not required. 
4. DISCUSSION: Petr appears correct about the thrust of 
the decision in Roth and in Bishop v. Wood. Roth, for example, 
stated that 
"Mere proof ••• that his record of non-retention 
in one · job, taken alone, might make him somewhat 
less attractive -to some other employer would 
hardly establish the kind of foreclosure of oppor-
tunities amounting to a deprivation of 'liberty.'" 
408 U.S. at 575 n.13. 
Bishop v. Wood stated that" [t]he same conclusion applies to the 
discharge of a public employee whose position is terminable at 
the will of the employer when there is no public disclosure of 
the reasons for the discharge." 44 U.S.L.W. at 4822. These cases 
may not be entirely on all fours, as here the conclusion was that 
the tei:Jination itself was highly stigmatizing, virtually foreclosing 
any future schooling. The non-renewal, in Roth, may not have been 
quite as stigmatizing, but the language of Roth, quoted supra, 
certainly suggests this is but a matter of degree, not of kind. 
The "bright line," if indeed there is one, seems to call for release 
- of the stigmatizing information which led to the dismissal before 
f . 
L I 







per curiam in Codd v. Velger, No. 75-812, at 4. On the other hand, 
this Court has not decided whether the fact that a person will 
"have no practical alternative but to consent to the release of 
such information if they wished to be seriously considered" for 
other openings, Codd v. Velger, at 3, is tantam9unt to dissemination 
of the stigmatizing information~ 
In any case, I am not sure that the school did not do enough 
for resp here. She was given plenty of warning about what was 
coming. I am not at all sure that state- schools should have to 
jump through more hoops before they can dismiss someone. 
There is a response. 
1/10/77 
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JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
if;_ 
March 11, 1977 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: cases held for No. 75-812 -- Codd v. Velger 
Two cases have been held for Codd v. Velger, No. 
75-812, decided February 22, 1977. Both cases present 
issues not resolved by our decision in Codd. 
~ ~ -- . 
In University of Missouri v. Horowitz, No. 76-695, /J-c~-c.,,,.4..,.,,.,,_, 
the CA 8 ruled that the dismissal of a student from ~- . A . 1 
mediQal school, even absen an publicization of reas~ 
there fo r ; was sufficiently stigmatizing to entit e the ./-o lJ/~ student to a Roth hearing. The apparent ~ aso ns for tiz, A~ B,-
~ -- AJ~ dismissal are non-specific in nature, __ apparently relat~ ~ 
~~---~1.. ~ ~ clinical performance, patient rapport, erratic atten-
~ cf!nce, and poor personal hygiene, and the analysis of 
 Codd requiring allegation of falsehood does not appear 
~- to be dispositive. I believe that Roth, John's opinion 
~ ;:-A - ;-.st Term in Bishop v. Wood, and his separate concur-
;:z,,,~rence in Codd, are dispositive, however, in holding that 
~ ~ some publication of reasons is an essential prerequisite 
~- •. J::.b a deprivation of libe:ty by stigmatization. See Roth, 
~ 8 U.S. at 575, n.13~ Bishop, 426 U.S. at 348-349. My 
L~ first choice would therefore be to summarily reverse~ my 
~ second would b~ to grant plaino. ~ 
! -
. In School Bd. of Brooklyn v. Huntley, No. 76-104, the 'IL 
CA 2 ordered a Roth hearing for an actin9 Erincigal who ✓r~ 
was removed on grounds of poor performance, whence a lett~ - .. #-
stating the reasons for removal was read at a Parent's I' ;-r~t,' 
Association meeting at which supporters of petitioner ~---
/~ -M.., ~ . --- 2,1,J.,.f.4 
~~'J-~ ~ 9,.:_ 
.ill~~ ,J_ '' ~ ' . ~ -r-..:-_:; --:-,~ "'O f1II# v_ ~4'U44.., ~ ...... ~M,,,O,C..IC,_ ~ .-&lace L/ • 






demanded to hear the charges against him. The reasons 
for dismissal again are such that the holding of Codd 
does not seem pertinent. On the merits this seems a 
tougher case than Horowitz, presenting the questions 1) 
whether there was sufficient publicization of the reasons, 
and 2) if so whether, in light of the fact that respondent 
has already taken another job as a teacher, there was 
sufficient injury to reputation to amount to constitu-
tional stigmatization. I will vote to grant. 
Sincerely, 






76-695 University of Missouri v. Horowitz, heretofore 
held for No. 75-812 - Codd v. Velger. 
er (O".k 
,· 
In University of Missouri v. Horowitz, No. 76-695, 
the CA 8 ruled that the dismissal of a student from 
medical school, even absent any publicization of reasons 
therefor, was sufficiently stigmatizing to entitle the 
student to a Roth hearing. The apparent reasons for the 
dismissal are non-specific in nature, apparently relating 
to clinical Ferformance, patient rapport, erratic atten-
dance, and poor personal hygiene, and the analysis of 
Codd requiring allegation of falsehood does not appear 
to be dispositive. I believe that Roth, John's opinion 
last Term in Bishop v. Wood, and his separate concur-
rence in Codd, are dispositive, however, in holding that --
some publication of reasons is an essential prerequisite 
to a deprivation of liberty by stigmatization. See Roth, 
408 U.S. at 575, n.13; Bishop, 426 U.S. at 348-349. My 
first choice would therefore be to summarily reverse; my 
second would be to grant plaino. 
• 
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1st DRAFT -
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffl°ulated: --:::~ ~-=-°"" 
BOARD OF CURATORS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 
MISSOURI ET AL. v. CHARLOTTE HOROWITZ 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
No. 76-695. Decided April -, 1977 
PER CuruAM. 
Respondent, Charlotte Horowitz, was dismissed as a student 
at the University of Missouri/Kansas City Medical School 
during what would have been her final year of study. She 
brought the present action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against 
the school and certain of its officials, alleging that the dis-
missal was constitutionally required to be preceded by a 
hearing at which she would be allowed to appear and present 
evidence in her own behalf. After a full tria.l, the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri 
entered judgment against respondent, explicitly finding that 
she was "afforded full procedural due process" by the Medical 
School. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals 
for . the Eighth Circuit, that judgment was reversed. 538 F. 
'2d 1317. The court held that the stigma attaching to her dis-
missal amounted to a deprivation of liberty, so that she was 
constitutionally entitled to prior notice and opportunity to 
be heard on the reasons for her dismissal. A motion for re-
hearing en bane was denied by a vote of five-to-three. Be-
cause we think that the Court of Appeals wrongly concluded 
that respondent had been deprived of any protected liberty 
interest, we vacate and remand for further proceedings. 
The opinions of the Court of Appeals and the District Court 
indicate that there is little disagreement as to the factual 
background of this case. Respondent was admitted with ad-
vanced standing to the Medical School in the fall of 1971. 
Faculty dissatisfaction with her performance was called to her 





2 BOAR1' OF OURATOR~ v. HOROWITZ 
to her second and final year on a probationary basis. In the 
m_iddle 2 f the final ~ ar, after furtlier review of her progress 
by the faculty, it was concluded that she should not be con. 
sidered for graduation in June of that year. Respondent 
elected kl "request a set of oral and practical exammations as 
an 4 appeal' " of that a ecision. df the seven doctors who 
administered these examinations, two recommended that she 
be graduated on schedule, and the other five recommended 
that she should not graduate on schedule. Two of the l~tter 
recommended that she be immediately dropped from the 
school. Opinion of the District Court, Petition, at A-24, 
A-25. Following these recommendations, school authorities 
first decided th;tt she should not be allowed to graduate 
on schedule, and then after further deliberations notified her 
that she was being dismissed from school. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals rests on its finding 
that Horowitz' dismissal deprived her of liberty because it 
substantially impa~red her opportunities to continue her med-
ical education or to return to employment in a medically re-
lated field. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 
( 1972), this Court stated that a constitutional liberty interest 
might be infringed in some cases where a State declines to re-
employ a teacher even though the teacher had no tenure-type 
property interest in his job: 
"The State, in declining to rehire the respondent, did 
not make any charge against him that might seriOl.lsly 
damage his standing and associations in his community. 
It did not base the nonrenewal of his contract on a charge, 
for example, that he had been guilty of dishonesty, or im~ 
morality. Had it done so, this would be a different case. 
For ' [w]here a person's good name, reputation, honor, or 
integrity is at stake because of what the government is 
doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are 
essential.' 
"Similarly, there is no suggestion that the State, in 
declining to re-employ the respQndent, imposed on him a 
~tshf 







BOARD OF CURATORS v. HOROWITZ 3 
stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to 
take advantage of other employment opportunities. The 
State, for ex3:mple, did not invoke any regulations to bar 
the respondent from all other public employment in state 
universities." / d., at 573. ( Citations omitted.) 
Last Term in Bishol!,, v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341 (1976), the 
Court elaborated i°ipon the type of situ~tion in which an em-
ployment termination might infringe a protected liberty in-
terest. In upholding the dismissal of a policeman without a 
hearing, the Court rejected the theory that the mere fact of 
dismissal, absent some publicization of reasons for the action, 
could amount to a stigma infringing one's liberty: 
"In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, we recog-
nized that the nonretention of an untenured college 
teacher might make him somewhat less attractive to other 
employers. but nevertheless concluded that it would 
stretch the concept too far 'to suggest that a person is 
deprived of liberty when he simply is not rehired in one 
job but remains as free as before to seek another.' Id., at 
575. This same conclusion applies to the discharge of a 
public employee whose position is terminable at the will 
of the employer when there is no public disclosure of the 
reasons for the discharge. 
"In this case the asserted reasons for the City Man-
ager's decision were communicated orally to the petitioner 
in private and also were stated in writing in ai;iswer to 
interrogatories after this litigation commenced. Since the 
former pommunication was not made public, it cannot 
properly form the basis for a claim that petitioner's in-
terest in his 'good name, reputation, honor, or integrity' 
was thereby impaired." Id., at 348. (Footnotes omitted.) 
The constitutional protection against stigmatization is 
·surely no greater in the case of a student's dismissal from a 
public institution than in the case of a job termination. As-
' . 
suming that the latter standard applies, see Roth, supra; 





4 BOARD OF ~URATORS v. HOROWITZ 
complaint seeking to esfablish that removal from a graduat~ 
school progra.µ1 resulted in a deprivation of liberty would be 
an assertiop ·that information or allegations harmful to repu-
tation were · in some way publicized. There is not~ ip 
respondent's complaint, ,or in the opinions below, to suggest 
that there has been any sort of p4bliciz tion by the Medical 
Sclioo m the present case. 
Nor under Roth or B-ishop can it be said that dismissal of 
respondent from a state medical school under these circum-
stances "imposed on [her] a stigma or other disability that 
foreclosed [her] freedom to take advantage ~f other employ-
ment opportunities." R,oth, supra, at 573. The refusal of 
a state operated law or medical school to graduate a student 
will necessarily "foreclose" that student from practicing law 
or medicine if the State requires graduation from a pro-
fessional school as a condition for a license to practice the 
profession. But if Roth and Bishop were extended in such 
a manner, every refusal of an educational institution to gradu-
ate a student on schedule would deprive that student of a 
liberty interest implicating the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
cedural due process. 
The District Court here held that respondent had been 
accorded such process, but we think that neither of the 
courts . below need have reached that issue with respect to 
respondent's liberty claims. Missouri did not, by virtue 
of the fact that respondent was dismissed from medical 
school, bar her from all other public employment or public 
educ~.tion. The fact that her failure to graduate cost her a 
job opportunity conditioned upon receipt of a degree does not 
even rise to the level of the claim rejected in Bishop, where it 
was alleged that dismissal would make the employee less 
attractive to other employers. Here respondent was dis-
l 
missed, not from a position of employment comparable to 
that which she might have obtained after graduation, but 
from her place as a student in the Medical School. We think 
it follows a fortiori from the above quoted language in Bishop 













BOARD OF CURATORS v. HOROWITZ 5 
vents the student from obtaining jobs which a.re conditioned 
upon the obtaining of sµch a degree, implicates no Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty inter~st. 
-W e accordmgly rev;.se the holding of the court below in-
sofar as it holds that a constitutional interest in liberty has 
been infringed. This determinatio1~ does not entirely dispose 
of the case, however, since there al21?.!::ar in the complaint un-
resolved cont~ s whi~ could be read to allege that _Je-
spoi1dent's dismissal amount'ectto a deprivation of a contrac-
tual prop~ iiiterest analogous £o that of a tenured public 
----- qr __, paq I 
employee':" 
Whatever may be the merits of the contention that a 
student in a public institution, in the absence of statutes or 
regulations such as those involved in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 
565, 573-57 4 ( 1975) , could have a Fourteenth Amendment 
property interest in obtaining a degree, respondent's claim 
would necessarily depend on questions of state law not dis-
cussed by either the Court of Appeals or the District Court. 
See Bishop, supra, at 343-347; Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 
134 (1974); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 599-603 
(1972); Roth, supra, at 576-578. We think it should be first 
addressed by them, and we therefore vacl\.te the judgment of 
the District Court and of the Court of Appeals and remand 
the case for further proceedings. 
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~ < ~ entered judgment against respondent, explicitly finding that 
Respondent, Charlotte Horowitz, was dismissed as a student 
at the University of Missouri/Kansas City Medical School 
during what would have been her final year of study. She 
brought the present action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against 
the school and certain of its officials, alleging that the dis-
missal was constitutionally required to be preceded by a 
hearing at which she would be allowed to appear and present 
evidence in her own behalf. After a full trial, the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri 
?1' ) .J--
11
~ she was "afforded full procedural due process" by the Medical 
~ -v,-- School. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals 
~ ~ ~ 6,--t-:- for the Eighth Circuit, that judgm~nt was rev~rsed. 538 _F. 
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2 BOARr> OF C';URAT0'.11~ v. HOROWITZ 
to her second and final year on a probationary basis. In the 
middle of the final year, after further review of her progress 
by the faculty, it was concluded that she should not be con-
sidered for graduation in June of that year. Respondent 
elected to "request a set of oral and practical examinations as 
an 'appeal' " of that decision. Of the seven doctors who 
administered these examinations, two recommended that she 
be graduated on schedule, and the other five recommended 
that she should not graduate on schedule. Two of the l~tter 
recommended that she be immediately dropped from the 
school. Opinion of the District Court, Petition, at A-24, 
A-25. Following these recommendations, school authorities 
first decided thl:Lt she should not be allowed to graduate 
on schedule, and then after further deliberations notified her 
that she was being dismissed from school. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals rests on its finding 
that Horowitz' dismissal deprived her of liberty because it 
substantially impaired her opportunities to continue her med-
ical education or to return to employment in a medically re-
lated field. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 
(1972) , this Court stated that a constitutional liberty interest 
might be iijfr~nged in some cases where a State declines to re-
employ a teacher even though the teacher had no tenure-type 
property interest in his job: 
"The State, in declining to rehire the respondent, did 
not make any charge against him that might seri0t,lsly 
damage his standing and associations in his community. 
It did not base the nonrenewal of his contract on a charge, 
for example, that he had been guilty of dishonesty, or im-
morality. Had it done so, this would be a different case. 
For '[w]here a person's good name, reputation, honor, or 
integrity is at stake because of what the government is 
doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are 
essential.' 
"Similarly, there is no suggestion that the State, in 
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stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to~] 
take advantage of other employment opportunities. The 
State, for ex~mple, did not invoke any regulations to bar 
the respondent from all other public employment in state 
universities." Id., at 573. ( Citations omitted.) 
Last Term in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341 (1976), the 
Court elaborated upon the type of situ11tion in which an em-
ployment termination might infringe a protected liberty in-
terest. In upholding the dismissal of a policeman without a 
hearing, the Court rejected the theory that the mere fact of 
dismissal, absent some publicization of reasons for the action, 
could amount to a stigma infringing one's liberty: 
"In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, we recog-
nized that the nonretention of an untenured college 
teacher might make him somewhat less attractive to other 
employers, but nevertheless concluded that it would 
stretch the concept too far 'to suggest that a person is 
deprived of liberty when he simply is not rehired in one 
job but remains as free as before to seek another.' Id., at 
575. This same conclusion applies to the discharge of a 
public employee whose position is terminable at the will 
of the employer when there is no public disclosure of the 
reasons for the discharge. 
"In this case the asserted reasons for the City Man-
ager's decision were communicated orally to the petitioner 
in private and also were stated in writing in answer to 
interrogatories after this litigation commenced. Since the 
former pommunication was not made public, it cannot 
properly form the basis for a claim that petitioner's in-
terest in his 'good name, reputation, honor, or integrity' 
was thereby impaired." Id., at. 348. (Footnotes omitted.) 
The constitutional protection against stigmatization is 
·surely no greater in the case of a student's dismissal from a 
public insfitution than in the case of a job termination. As. 
suming that the latter standard applies, see Roth, supra; 
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), a critical element in any 
·- -----
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complaint seeking to es~ablish that removal from a graduate 
school prograi;rl. resulted in a deprivation of liberty would be 
an assertiop ·that information or 1;1,llegations harmful to repu-
tation were · in some way publicized. There is nothing in 
respondent's complajnt, ,or in the opinions below, to suggest 
that there has been any s'ort of p4bliciz~tion by the Medical 
School in the present case. 
Nor under Roth or Bishop can it be said that dismissal of 
respondent from a state medical school under these circum-
stances "imposed on [her] a stigma or other disability that 
foreclosed [her] freedom to take advantage qf other employ-
ment opportunities." Roth, supra, at 573. The refusal of 
a state operated law or medical school to graduate a student 
will necessarily "foreclose" that student from practicing law 
or medicine if the State requires graduation from a pro-
fessional school as a condition for a license to practice the 
profession. But if Roth and Bishop were extended in such j 
a manner, every refusal of an educational institution to gradu-
ate a student on schedule would deprive that student of a 
liberty interest implicating the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
cedural due process. 
The District Court here held tha.t respondent had been 
accorded such process, but we think that neither of the 
courts . below need have reached that issue with respect to 
respondent's liberty claims. Missouri did not. by virtue 
of the fact that respondent was dismissed from medical 
school. bar her from all other public employment or public 
educ11tion. The fact that her failure to graduate cost her ~ 
job opportunity conditioned upon receipt of a degree does not 
even rise to the level of the claim rejected in Bishop, where it 
was alleged that dismissal would make the employee less_, 
attractive to other employers. Here respondent was dis-
missed, not from a position of employment comparable to 
that which she might have obtained after graduation, but 
from her place as a student in the Medical School. We think 
it follows aj ortiori from the above quoted language in Bishop 
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vents the student from obtaining jobs which are conditioned .--
upon the obtaining of sµch a degree, implicates no Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty inter~st. 
We accordingly reverse the holding of the court below in-
sofar as it holds that a constitutional interest in liberty has 
been infringed. This determination does not entirely dispose 
of the case, however, since there appear in the complaint un-
resolved contentions which could be read to allege that re-
spondent's dismissal amounted to a deprivation of a contrac-
tual pr22_erty interest analogous to that of a tenureq public 
employee. · 
Whatever may be the merits of the contention that a 
student in a public institution, in the absence of statutes or 
regulations such as those involved in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 
565, 573-574 (1975) , could have a Fourteenth Amendment 
property interest in obtaining a degree, respondent's claim 
would necessarily depend on questions of state law not dis-
cussed by either the Court of Appeals or the District Court. 
See Bishop, supra, at 343-347; Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 
134 (1974); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 599-603 
(1972); Roth, supra, at 576-578. We think it should be first 
addressed by them, and we therefore vac~te the judgment of 
the District Court and of the Court of Appeals and remand 
the case for further proceedings. 
It is so ordered. 
? 
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port for the District Court's conchNon that 
the ju also felt that the Union ~ad violat-
ed its d ty. The selection of these two 
verdict fo ms supports only t};/e conclusion 
that the j y was confused fs to what its 
responsibilit"es under the 1'w were and, 
thus, return d inconsisttn verdicts. 
This concl sion is sup orted by several 
factors . Firs , the inst uctions given did 
not unambigu usly stao/ tha.t the jury must 
find initially ~t the Union violated its 
duty of fair re rese/tation before it con-
siders the emplo er'/ liability. Second, the 
jury's question tc\ tne court asking whether 
it could find for o/ e defendant and not the 
other indicates t~at the jury was uncertain 
as to the app~i aqle Jaw. Although the 
District Court's ffi\ mative response is the-
oretically corr ct, in that the jury could 
find only agai st the \union and not against 
Safeway, th answe~ could also lead the 
jury to belie e that it ~ould legally find for 
the Union ut agains~ Safeway. Finally, 
the verdic forms the"?selves did not set 
forth the requirement that the Union be 
initially und liable. 
In the face of these inc' nsistent verdicts, 
the pre ent judgment ca not stand and a 
new tr al is necessary. S Wood v. Holi-
day I ns, Inc., 508 F .2d 1 :l, 115 (5th Cir. 
1975) Hopkins v. Coen, 431 .2d 1055, 1059 
(6th Cir. 1970). 
I 
Charlotte HOROWITZ, Appellant, 
v. 
BOARD OF CURATORS OF the 
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI et 
al., Appellees. 
No. 75-1949. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Eighth Circuit. 
Submitted June 15, 1976. 
Decided July 16, 1976. 
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc 
Denied Sept. 27, 1976. 
See 542 F .2d 1335. 
A medical student brought a civil 
rights action challenging her dismissal from 
a school of medicine. The United States 
District Court for the Western District of 
Missouri, William G. Juergens,* Senior Dis-
trict Judge, entered judgment for the uni-
versity's board of curators, and the medical 
student appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Ross, Circuit Judge, held that where the 
student's dismissal resulted in her being 
stigmatized in such a way that she would be 
unable to continue her medical education 
and her chances of returning to employ-
ment in a medically related field would be 
severely damaged, due process required 
that she be accorded a hearing before dis-
missal. 
Reversed . and remanded. 
Colleges and Universities c;::;::,9 
Constitutional Law c;:=275(1) 
Where dismissal of medical student 
from medical school resulted in her being 
stigmatized in such manner that she would 
be unable to continue her medical education 
and severely damaged her chances of re-
turning to employment in medically related 
field, dismissal violated student's due proc-
ess rights when it was unaccompanied by 
hearing. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; U.S.C.A. 
Const. Amend. 14. 
• Hon. William G. Juergens, Sr. Judge of the District Court of the Eastern Dist. of Illinois, 
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Arthur A. Benson, II, Kansas City, Mo., 
for appellant. 
Marvin E. Wright, Columbia, Mo., for 
appellee, Jackson A. Wright, James S. New-
berry and Richard S. Paden, Columbia, Mo., 
and Fred Wilkins, Kansas City, Mo., on 
brief. 
Before HEANEY, ROSS and STEPHEN-
SON, Circuit Judges. 
ROSS, Circuit Judge. 
Charlotte Horowitz has brought this ac-
tion under 42 U .S.C. § 1983 challenging her 
dismissal from the University of Missouri-
Kansas City (UMKC) School of Medicine in 
July 1973. The defendants are the govern-
ing body of the institution and certain offi-
cials of the medical school. The case was 
tried without a jury and judgment was for 
the defendants, from which Horowitz now 
appeals. We reverse the district court 
judgment. 
The facts are not seriously in dispute. 
The UMKC Medical School admitted its 
first students in August 1971; Horowitz 
was admitted at that time as an advanced 
standing student. She has a Bachelor's de-
gree in chemistry from Barnard College and 
a Master's in psychology from Columbia 
University. She studied pharmacology at 
Duke for one year, taking the same curricu-
lum as the first year medical students 
there. She began as a sophomore at the 
Women's Medical College of Pennsylvariia 
but withdrew in good standing because of 
illness her first semester. She also did 
graduate study and worked in the field of 
psychopharmacology at the National Insti-
tute of Health in Bethesda, Maryland for 
five years. She scored above the 99th per-
centile on the Graduate Record Examina-
tion in Verbal Aptitude, Quantitative Apti-
tude, Advanced Psychology and Advanced 
Chemistry. Her scores on the Medical Col-
lege Admissions Test were also extremely 
I. The University draws a distinction between 
receiving credit and satisfactorily completing a 
course, and contends that Horowitz did not 
satisfactorily complete courses besides Erner-
high, with scores in the 99th percentile in 
the General Information and Science cate-
gories. She received excellent recommen-
dations from those with whom she had 
worked at the National Institute of Health 
and educators. 
The UMKC Medical _School's curriculum 
is intended to educate its students to be-
come competent practicing physicians. 
Therefore, the school considers that a stu-
dent must become proficient in clinical 
skills in order to earn an M.D. degree_ 
Both Horowitz and the University knew at 
the time of her entrance, however, that she 
intended to become a psychiatrist and teach 
or do research. 
The policies and regulations of the school 
do not state the requirements of graduation 
in terms of a certain number of courses 
which must be completed. During the last 
two years of medical education at UMKC a 
student is required to pursue studies in 
rotational units which deal with various 
areas of medicine: e. g. Pathology-Anato-
my, Psychiatry, Obstetrics-Gynecology. 
These units generally included clinical re-
sponsibilities as well as academic study. 
Horowitz received credit for all these rota-
tions except Emergency Room, her last ro-
tation, which was not completed until after 
it was determined she would not graduate. 1 
Her academic (as opposed to practical) per-
formance certainly gave no cause for com-
plaint. She scored first in the school on 
Part I of the National Board Examination 
for medical students and second on Part II. 
She ranked fourth in her class in quarterly 
exams given in February 1973, and second 
in the May 1973 exams. In the latter ex-
amination she was either first or second in 
14 of the 30 categories. 
Although she received credit in all rota-
tional units except Emergency Room and 
her docent, the faculty member who had 
the closest contact with her, regarded hc:r 
performance as outstanding throughout her 
gency Room. It does not appear that this dis-
tinction was communicated to Horowitz or tht 
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first year,2 other faculty members felt her 
clinical performance was deficient. This 
first came to light in the · spring of 1972 
when faculty members in the Pediatrics 
course criticized her Jack of patient rapport 
and "expertise in coming to the fundamen-
tals of the clinical problem," erratic attend-
ance, and poor personal hygiene. These 
criticisms were brought to Horowitz's at-
tention by her docent, although she was not 
shown her formal course evaluations. 
In November of 1972 the University's 
Provost for the Health Sciences promulgat-
ed changes in the procedures for deciding 
questions of students' academic standing. 
The Council on Evaluation thereafter made 
recommendations to the Coordinating Com-
mittee, which consisted of faculty members. 
The Coordinating Committee had veto pow-
er over the Council's recommendations, and 
the Dean had veto power over recommenda-
tions of the Coordinating Committee. Pro-
vision was made for students' personal ap-
pearances before the Cou ncil upon its re-
quest if that body felt it had inadequate 
information. It was also provided that a 
student could be given additional practical 
and oral examinations if the Council needed 
l 
Toward the end of her first year at the 
school, Horowitz's record was reviewed by 
the Council on Evaluation, a body of stu-
dents and faculty, which recommended to 
the Dean that she not be advanced to Year 
VI, the final yeii.r of the medical school. 
However, in a Jetter dated July 5, 1972, 
which confirmed an earlier conversation, 
the Dean told Horowitz that she was being 
advanced to Year VI, but was on 12robation. 
The Jetter pointed out her deficiencies as 
follows: 
Your acquisition of information is good. 
Your relationship with others has not 
been good and represents a major defi-
ciency. You need to improve your rela-
tionship with others rapidly and substan-
tially. This involves keeping to estab-
lished schedules; meeting all clinical re-
sponsibilities on time and gracefully; at-
tending carefully to personal appearance, 
including hand washing and grooming; 
participating appropriately in the activi-
ties of the School; and directing criti-
cisms and suggestions maturely to your 
Docent and to the faculty member who is 
in charge of a curriculum block as you 
may have criticisms and suggestions. 
The Jetter also stated that noncompliance 
with certain standards of conduct "is incom-
patible with continued progress and gntlu-
ation." After she was placed on probation, 
ifc;';owitz was counseled frequently by her 
docent, the Dean and other faculty mem-
bers until her ultimate dismissal. 
2. The docent's role was compared by UMKC to 
that of an ombudsman. During a student's 
academic career he or she would have more 
frequent and closer contact with the docent 
than any other faculty member. Horowitz's 
to resolve questions of competence as a 
physician. On December 26, 1972, the l 
Council on Evaluation reconsidered Horow-
itz's status and recommended that she not 
be allowed to graduate on schedule in June 
1973. This recommendation was accepted 
by the Coordinating Committee. The Dean 
approved this recommendation and on Feb-
ruary 7, 1973, he wrote a Jetter to Horowitz l 
reviewing a conference with her, held Janu-
ary 26. The Dean's Jetter stated that she 
had not made sufficient progress as out-
lined in the July 5 Jetter and was being 
continued on probation. She was informed 
that she would not be able to graduate as 
scheduled and that she would have to im-
prove markedly in the areas of clinical com-
petence, peer and patient relations, personal 
hygiene and ability to accept criticism. If 
she did not make the improvement con-
sidered necessary by the Council on Evalua-
tion, she would not be able to continue at 
the medical school after May. She was told 
that she could request a set of oral and 
practical examinations as an "appeal" of 
the decision not to graduate her in the 
spring of 1973. Horowitz initiated such a \ 
request. 
Since no such proceeding had ever been 
requested and no procedures had been set 
docent testified that he would have recom-
mended that she be allowed to graduate in the 
spring of 1973, and be given a res idency, and in 






- -1320 538 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
I 
up, the school had to create a procedure to 
be followed in Horowitz's case. It was ar-
ranged that she would be examined by sev-
en experienced physicians on the faculty, 
none of whom had appreciable previous con-
tact with Horowitz. They wo.µld evaluate 
her clinical abilities in the areas of pedia-
trics, pathology and anatomy, general medi-
cine, and obstetrics and gynecology. The 
Dean informed the seven physicians by let-
ter and a meeting that they were to make 
one of three recommendations: a) gradua-
tion on schedule; b) continued probation 
and reassessment of her status in May 1973; 
c) dismissal from the medical school. The 
option of recommending additional study 
after May 1973 without dismissal was not 
given to them. A majority opinion of the 
seven doctors was to be determined and 
submitted to the Council on Evaluation. 
The examinations were conducted and the 
doctors submitted their reports. Two rec-
ommended that Horowitz graduate on 
schedule, two recommended that she contin-
ue on probation, and two recommended that 
she be dropped from school. One believed 
she was not qualified to graduate at that 
time, but expressed no further opinion. Al-
though there was no clear majority opinion 
the panel was not called together as the 
procedures contemplated. Their written in-
dividual recommendations were submitted 
to the Council on Evaluation. 
school. Horowitz wrote a letter to th1: 
Dean requesting that she be allowed to 
remain in school for a short time to correct 
her deficiencies, but this letter was not 
answered. 
On May 28, 1973, the Council on. Evalua-
tion met again to reconsider Horowitz's sta-
tus in light of her performance in courses 
taken that spring, and it was decided that 
she should be dropped from the school. On 
June 4 the Coordinating Committee accept-
ed this recommendation and Horowitz was 
notified by the Dean that she was no longer 
in school on July 3. Horowitz sought reYer-
sal of this decision from the Provost for the 
Health Sciences, who denied her request 
Horowitz was never given a chance to 
appear before the Council on Evaluation, 
the Coordinating Committee or the Dean, 
for a hearing during the dismissal proce-
dure, nor was she informed of the time or 
place of any of their meetings. Neither 
was she given copies of the formal evalua-
tions or other evidence which the Council 
and the Committee considered. 
The evidence reveals that Horowitz re-
jected suggestions by the medical school 
faculty that she alter her professional plans 
and seek a Ph.D. rather than a medical 
degree because a Ph.D. would not allow her 
to conduct the experimentation in psycho-
pharmacology that was her goal. It was 
stipulated that she was offered employment 
at the University of North Carolina, condi-
tional upon her obtaining the degree of 




































On May 1, 1973, after considering the ' 
panel's reports, the Council reaffirmed its 
opinion that Horowitz should not be al-
lowed to graduate in June, and the Coordi-
nating Committee accepted this recommen-
dation. The Dean also approved, and on 
May 7 this decision was communicated to 
Ms. Horowitz. At that time she was told 
that a decision would be made soon on 
whether she would be allowed to remain in 
. she had accepted that offer in November 
1972. It was also uncontroverted that Hor- 1 
owitz's dismissal from medical school will 
make it difficult or impossible for her to 
obtain employment in a m~ ted lAvv 




3. Dr. Cohen, who had 30 years of experience in 
hiring M .D.'s, Ph.D.'s and others for medical 
research in various institutions testified: 
Yes, I would be very much concerned about 
an individual who was dismissed from a 
medical school, or, for that matter, from any 
graduate school. This to me is a very serious 
matter and I would have to look very careful-
ly into that person's background, record and 
so forth. And if there were two individuals 
- . that, say, that person or someone else were 
applying and otherwise would have equal 
qualifications, roughly, I would Jean heavily 
to the other person who was not dismissed 
from a graduate school. 
• • • • • • 
Yes, I think it would be a significant black 
mark against that person's name, I think it 
would stigmatize that individual, I that that 
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The district court, in holding for defend-
ants, relied on "the immunity accorded [ed-
ucational authorities] in academic matters 
. ", absent a showing of bad faith or 
arbitrary and capricious action. We are 
I 
cognizant that some decisions recognize a 
~ 
distinction between expulsions for miscon-
duct and academic failure. See, e. g ., Brook-
ins v. Bonnell, 362 F.Supp. 379, 382 (E.D. 
Pa.1973). We express no opinion on the 
validity of that distinction under other cir-
cumstances. However, our decision in 
Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5, 8- 9 (8th Cir. 
1975) acknowledges "that the dictates of 
due process, long recognized as applicable to 
disciplinary expulsions may ap-
l ply in other cases as well, where the partic-ular circumstances meet the criteria articu-lated by the Supreme Court in Board of 
Regents v. Roth, [408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 
2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)], and Perry v. 
Sindermann, [408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 
L.Ed.2d 570 (1972)]." In Board of Regents 
v. Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at 573, 92 S.Ct. 
2707, the Court recognized that action of 
the state which "imposed . . . a stig-::----) 
ma or other disability that f_oreclosed . . / 
freedom to take advantage of other employ-
ment opportunities" was a deprivation of _ 
liberty which could not be accomplished 
without notice and a hearing. In Greenhill, 
supra, 519 F.2d at 8, we found such stigma-
tization where a medical student's expulsion 
for academic failure on 'the basis of lack of 
intellectual ability or inadequate prepara-
great difficulty to get into another medical 
school, if at all. 
Transcript at 25- 26. We note that UMKC's 
own application forms require that a student 
fully explain the reasons they were required to 
leave "any college, graduate or professional 
school . because of deficiencies in ei-
ther conduct or scholarship." Plaintiff's Exhib-
it 10. We believe the evidence in this cafils 
makes it fa ctually distinguishable from those in I 
which a damaging stigma was not proved or 
wa s inadequately alleged. E. g. Bishop v. 
Wood, - U.S. --, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed .2d 
684 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 
564, 573- 574, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 
(1972). 
tion effectively foreclosed him from pursu-
ing a medical education, because of the 
inherent suggestion that he was unfit to 
study medicine. 
The unrefuted evidence here establishes 
that Horowitz has been stigmatized by her 
dismissal in such a way that she will be 
unable to continue her medical education, 
and her chances of returning to employ-
ment in a medically related field are severe-
ly damaged. The dismissal was effected ) 
without the hearing required by the four- _ 
teenth amendment.« 
We reverse and remand to the district 
court with instructions to order defendants 
to provide Horowitz with a hearing before 
the decision making body or bodies, at 
which she shall have an opportunity to re-
but the evidence being relied upon for her 
dismissal and accorded all other procedural 
due process rights.5 
4. The parties agree that the appeal procedure, 
involving tests administered by the panel of 
seven doctors, related only to the decision not 
to graduate Horowitz, and not to the decision 
to expel her. Nevertheless, we doubt that this 
procedure would satisfy the requirement of due 
process, since the panel itself was only an exa-
mining board without any power except the 
power to make recommendations to another 
body which also had only that same power. 
5. Because of our disposition of this case we do 
not reach the substantive due process ground 
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BOARD OF CURA ro:as OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 
MISSOURI ET AL. V. CHARLOTTE HOROWITZ 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
No. 76-695 . Decided April -, 1977 
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL, dissenting. 
The Court's opinion is based on the assumption that re-
spondent's expulsion from medical school foreclosed her 
opportunity to practice medicine only because her failure to 
graduate means that she cannot obtain a state licen.se to 
practice. Ante, at 4. Were this the case, today's decision 
would follow directly from the Court's prior holding that, 
" [i] t stretches the concept too far to suggest that a person 
is deprived of 'liberty' when he simply is not rehired in one 
job but remains as free as before to seek another." Board of 
Regents v. Roth, 408 U . S. 564, 575 ( 1972). I woµld not 
agree with that conclusion, see id., at 587 (MARSHALL, J. , dis-
senting), but at least it would represent no further diminu-
tion of the protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amefldment. 
It is plain, however, that petitioners have not left Ms. 
Horowitz "as free as before. " The Court of Appeals found 
that it was " uncontroverted" that respondent's expulsion "will 
make it difficult or impossible for her to obtain employment 
in a medically related field or to enter another medical 
school." 538 F. 2d, at 1320.* Thus, petitioners' action has,. 
·* As the Court of Appeals held , the record evidence support ing this 
conclusion distinguishes the present case from the cases on which the 
Court relies. Thus, in Roth the Court explicit ly noted t hat the record 
did not support the Dist rict Court 's "nssumpt ion" t hat nonretention 
would hurt Roth's prospect~ for futu re employment. 408 U. S., at 574 
n. 13. Similarly, in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341 (1976 ), there was: 
"nothing involved except one job with one city ." Bishop v. Wood, 377 F . 
Supp. 501, 504 (WDNC 1973). See also Codd v. Velger, - U. S.-. 
-..,- .. , 




2 BOARD 0F 8URAT0RS v . H0ROWIT~ 
in effect, permanently barred respond~nt from employment 
in one of "the common occupations of the community." 
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915). Until today, I had 
thought it clear that such an action constitutes 11 d~privatiqn 
of liberty. Cf. ibid. 
I respectful}y dissent, 
- n. 11 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (no deprivat ion of liberty shown by 
fact that one employer corn,idered informa.tion in file a. bar to employment) , 
- -
-
~ttp-rtUU' (!fcnrl o-f tltt ~1titth ~htlta-
'J]lrru.ltitt-gton. :!E) . (!f. 211.;r)!., 
CH A M B ERS O F 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMU N April 11, 1977 / 
Re : No . 76-695 - Board of Curators v. Horowitz 
Dear Bill : 
Please j oin me in your per curiam. 
Sincµ;i • 
-
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
-
.... . ... ., 
76-695 
Bill: 
My vote at Conference was to grant this case and I am 
still . inclined to think it should be argued and briefed if 
,we are going to decide whether there is a liberty or property 
" interest implicate~ when a pupil .. flunks out" of a state 
college. .. .·~, - _, . . .. 
• I 
My tentative view is that no such interest exists. ~ .... There 
can hardly be a right to graduate or to any opportunity to 
graduate not afforded all other students. But nevertheless 
I have reservations as to whether an issue of this feneral 
interest and importance should be decided without fu l · 
briefing and argument. 
: ...... ·-~---:-
~ -
I could dispose of this case on the narrower ground that 
even if we assume, arltuendo, a liberty or property interest, 
Ma. Horowitz received all of the "process" that was due her. 
She bad repeated notice of her deficiencies and abundant 
opportunities to correct them. She also was afforded a special 
examination by a board of seven, five of whom rec011111ended that 
she not graduate. 
- ~~;J-· ... ~ ~ 
I would not take the case, however, simply to consider 
the adequacy of the "process". If the Conference votes to 
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;%5u.µrcmr ~ourl .of t~t 'Pirfuh .:%,tn.tts 
)]Ta.a frhigton. ~- <!J. 2.agr,1,~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM.J . BRENNAN, JR. Apr)l 12, 1977 
-
-
RE: No. 76-695 
Dear Thurgood: 
Board of Curators of the University of 
Missouri v. Horowitz 
Please join me in the dissenting opinion you have 
prepared in the above. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 








CHAMBER S Of' 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
-
j;u:prtutt ~ourt of "rt Jtnitt~ j;f:attg 
~lt&lpnghm. ~ . ~. 20,?Jl.~ 
April 13, 1977 
RE: 76-695 - Board of Curat ors of the 





Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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._aglfin.ghm. ~. QJ:. 20-ffe.lt~ 
JU S TI CE J O HN PAUL STEVENS 
Bill: 
April 13, 1977 
76-695 - Board of Curators of the University 
of Missouri v. Horowitz 
If this case is decided summarily, I propose to 








76-695 - Board of Curators of the University of Missouri et al. 
v. Charlotte Horowitz 
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring. 
The findings of the District Court do not directly address 
the question whether respondent's dismissal has effectively 
barred her from employment in the medical profession. · I do not 
believe either the Court of Appeals or this Court should decide 
such an issue in the first instance. I am persuaded, however, 
that Judge Juergens correctly concluded that petitioners gave 
respondent adequate notice, an adequate opportunity to be heard, 
and an adequate opportunity to correct the shortcomings that 
led to her dismissal. I therefore agree that the judgment of 





C H AMBERS OF 
.JUST IC E .J O HN PAUL STEVEN S 
-
j)npunu (!}!t.ltrl .o-f i4.t ~lt ~faug 
._agJri:ttg:to-14 ~- (!}. 20ffe'l,$ 
April 13, 1977 
/ 
Re: 76-695 - Board of Curators of the University 
of Missouri v. Horowitz 
Dear Bill: 
If this case is decided summarily, I propose to 
file the enclosed brief concurring opinion. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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76-695 - Board of Curators of the University of Missouri et al. 
v~ Charlotte Horowitz 
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring. 
The findings of the District Court do not directly address 
the question whether respondent's dismissal has effectively 
barred her from employment in the medical profession. · I do not 
believe either the Court of Appeals or this Court should decide 
such an issue in the first instance. I am persuaded, however, 
that Judge Juergens correctly concluded that petitioners gave 
respondent adequate notice, an adequate opportunity to be heard, 
and an adequate opportunity to correct the shortcomings that 
led to her dismissal. I therefore agree that the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals should be reversed. 
- -




JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR. April 14, 1977 
... 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: No. 76-695 Board of Curators of the University of 
Missouri v. Horowitz 
In light of all the writing I want to record myself 
(although I've already joined Thurgood's dissent) as will-
ing to dispose of this case on Lewis and John's grounds, 
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~-/-.. ~le.::/' ( ~ II-- ~ ~q"I.-.. ~~~ 
rf f;~~~) -1-~~ ~Vt 
p~~#"I,,, H4 ~ d,__c.. . 
~,tt..;{,)~ BENCH MEMO 
~-~~ • A_. },fifi.. w C: =~ C • ~ 
TO: Mr. J1.i st1ce Powell ~~._, /vA..... 1977 
FROM: Bob Comfort 
No. 76-695 Board of Curators v. Horowitz 
There are at least six different approaches the Court 
could take to reverse in this case. A seventh approach -
CA8's - leads to affirmance. The neatest and narrowest 
reversal route appears to be one not addressed by the parties 
or the courts below: refusing to consider Respondent's claim 
to a due process hearing before the Coordinating Comittee, on 
the ground that she never requested any such hearing. Because 
there is so much ferment among the Justices i n this area of 
the law, the narrowest possible opinion may be desirable. 
I. 
Broad Academic Exemption 
The University's front-line position seems to be a 
request that the Court recognize a broad exemption from the - ' -constraints of due process for 1, cademic decision. The 
University argues that courts traditionally have refrained 
from interfering with school officials' decisions to dismiss a 
student for academic, as opposed to disciplinary reasons. 
They can cite only two court of appeals cases on this point, 
however, and neither supports their broad position, 
Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976); Gaspar v. 
Bruton, 512 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1975). Gaspar, relying on 
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), explicit l y found a propery 






enrollment fees were paid. The court went on to find that 
plaintiff got more process than was due. Similarly, the 
Mahavongsanan court appears to have assumed that some process 
was due; it also concluded that plaintiff was accorded enough. 
The r e appears to be no authority for the proposition 
that no liberty or property interests can ever be implicated 
by academic dismissal from a state school. A rule to that 
effect would have to be created for this case. It might be a 
difficult rule to defend, given that academic dismissals 
conceivably could jeopardize employment and other "liberty" 
interests in the same way that disciplinary dismissal can. 
Also, while no one has the right to attend or graduate from 
most state inst i tutions of higher education, once a student is 
admitted he might be said to have an "expectancy" that he will 
be graduated unless he fails to meet certain requirements. A 
similar expectancy was recognized as "property" in Perry v. 
Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (nontenured professor's 
"expectancy" of rehiring by reason of a de facto tenure 
policy). Accord, Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164-231 
(1974) (concurring opinion of Powell, J.; concurring and 
dissenting opinion of White, J.; dissenting opinions of 
Douglas and Marshall, JJ.) 
Of course, the "expectancy" rationale of Perry may 
have been weakened by Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), in 
which the Court seemed more willing to hold that a substant i ve 





attached to it. To the extent that the Court is unwilling to 
recognize any expectancy beyond the explicit procedural 
limitations set forth by the state - ~-~-, report cards and a 
failure notice - a student would have no right to any process 
other than those procedures. 
3. 
This position could be developed consistently with 
Bishop and Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976). It is not 
one that I should like to see pushed very far, though, s i nce it 
tends to reduce the Due Process Clause to trivial ity. Your 
concurrence in Arnett seems to state a principle of due 
process closer to what the Framers must have thought they were 
declaring. On the basis of the Arnett concurrence, I think an 
"expectancy" amounting to "property" could be found in certain 
circumstances in the educational field. The next question 
would concern the appropriate amount of process, which 
certainly ought not to be very great. Note that Respondent 
has not made such a property claim in this case. She goes off 
strictly on "liberty" - reputation plus employment. For that 
reason, it may not be necessary to announce any broad ru l e 
precluding the establishment of an "expectancy" in state 
higher education. 
II 
"Liberty" as Injury to Reputation Plus 
Foreclosure From Employment 
The University's second l ine of defense - and Justice 
Rehnquist's position - assumes that there may be dismissals 





such infringement occurred here. This position gives a very 
narrow reading to Roth and to Bishop v. Wood. 
4. 
In Roth the Court refused to find any liberty 
interest infringed, in part because there was "no suggestion 
that the State, in declining to re-employ the respondent, 
imposed on him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed 
his freedom to take advantage of other employment 
opportunities. The State, for example, did not invoke any 
regulations to bar the respondent from all other public 
employment in the state. 408 U.S. at 573. In Bishop v. Wood, 
the Court appeared to assume that the stigma imposed by the 
policeman's dismissal could harm his attempts to gain future 
employment, but held that since the city had not publicized 
the dismissal it was not the city's responsibility. 
From these two cases, the University and Justice 
Rehnquist draw the conclusion that there has been no 
foreclosure or stigma imposed by the University. All the 
University has done is to flunk Respondent out. The 
University itself did not deny her the job she had been 
promised at the University of North Carolina; North Carolina 
foreclosed her from the job because she failed to get an M.D. 
degree. Similarly, the University did not foreclose her from 
obtaining a license to practice medicine anywhere by virtue of 
any stigmatizing information it published. If other medical 
schools choose to ask whether she was ever dismissed from a 
medical school and exclude her on that basis, that is their 





This view can be drawn out of Roth and Bishop. In 
both cases, it could be assumed that the employer's dismissal 
would make it harder for the employee to find another job, at 
least if prospective employers wished to know the 
circumstances of his departure from previous employment. Yet 
in neither was that possibility considered "foreclosure." 
5. 
That could be interpreted as a rule that "foreclosure" 
requires post-firing action by the employer, affirmative 
"blackballing" steps to prevent future hiring. Here, other 
medical schools remain free to accept Respondent if they wish. 
Respondent insists that this blinks reality. The 
court below noted uncontroverted testimony that Respondent's 
"dismissal from medical school will make it difficult or 
impossible for her to obtain employment in a medically related 
field or to enter another medical school." App. at 53-54. 
Thus, this case is not clearly controlled by Bishop or Roth, 
where there was no evidence that plaintiff's dismissal 
definitely would limit other employment opportunities. I According to what I can glean from the file, it was this point 
that prevented you from joining Justice Rehnquist's summary 
reversal. It is precisely the question that the Court found 
itself unable to decide when it reversed in Codd v. Velger, 
429 U.S. 624 (1977). A decision to extent Roth-Bishop here in -order to protect academic discretion could cause unforeseen 
problems in other contexts. Because there are narrower -







such ap extension may be unnecessary. 
III 
More Than Enough Process Provided 
The Court could assume arguendo that liberty or 
property rights are implicated, and proceed to detail the 
amount of process that is due. Turning to the test elaborated 
in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Court would 
first assess the private interest at stake. A student's sole 
interest in an academic dismissal is that he be dismissed on 
the basis of a fair appraisal of his academic performance. 
Because of the importance of academic degrees to various J!,;._~;___ 
career opportunities, this may be a significant interest. ~ 
The second Eldridge factor is the fairness and 
l
re ~ l} ty of existing procedures. It is here that the 
judicial inclination toward disinvolvement in academic affairs 
becomes truly relevant. Once the school establishes a minimum 
achievement level for advancement, tabulating the grades to 
see if the student makes a cut-off is a ministerial act. 
Concerns about fairness arise only at the level of grading, 
the teacher-student evaluation. It is precisely this sort of 
"fact-finding" that courts are incompetent to review. 
Requiring a due process hearing to allow a student to 
challenge the fairness of academic evaluations is a 
meaningless act, since a court would be unequipped to 





"Misconduct and failure to attain a standard of 
scholarship cannot be equated. A hearing may be 
required to determine charges of misconduct, but a 
hearing may be useless or harmful in finding out the 
truth concerning scholarship. There is a clear 
dichotomy between a student's due process rights in 
disciplinary dismissals and in academic dismissals." 
(cites omitted). 
Mahavongsanan, supra, at 450. 
7. 
"The reason for this rule is that in matters of 
scholarship, the school authorities are uniquely 
qualified by training and experience to judge the 
qualifications of a student, and the efficiency of 
instruction depends in no small degree upon the 
school faculty's freedom from interference from other 
non-educational tribunals." 
Connelly v. University of Vermont, 244 F.Supp. 156 ( D. Vt. 
1965). Accord Keys v. Sawyer, 353 F. Supp. 936, 939 (S.D. 
Tex. 1973). Because of this, periodic notification of the 
student as to how he is doing - i.e., report cards - and 
perhaps an academic warning that failure is imminent unless 
improvement is made would seem sufficient to safeguard a 
student's academic interest, at least to the extent that they 
can be protected by procedures. 
In light of this fact, the third Eldridge factor -
the governmental interest in avoiding the burden of more 
procedures - takes on significance. The government has a 
clear interest in avoiding the provision of futile procedures. 
Respondent's reply to this line of argument could be 
that she is entitled to a hearing so that she can demonstrate 
that she really is not being dismissed for academic reasons at 







religious prejudice. Some courts have recognized the right to 
a hearing to prevent dismissals for such improper reasons. 
Brookins v. Bonnell, 362 F.Supp. 379 (E.D. Pa. 1973); see 
Connelly, supra. 
I think that this position may misapprehend the 
purpose of a due process hearing, however. See Roth, 408 U.S. 
at 573 (purpose of hearing is to refute the charge). Such a 
hearing is not designed to test whether additional, 
impermissible motives may have contributed to the imposition 
of loss. The hearing instead is designed to allow a challenge 
to the factfinding upon which the imposition of loss was 
based, to ensure that the critical facts - here, academic, 
incompetence - did occur. But we have already noted that in 
the academic context, courts will be unable to judge the - --------- - -
strength of those facts. Hence, a court could be faced with a - ------ ---~ case in which the teachers and school say a student was unfit 
academically, and the student has shown that all his 
professors hated him because he was Jewish and alleges that 
they graded him down because of it. If I am right in 
concluding that the court could not second-guess the academic 
evaluation, then what is made out is a possible violation of 
equal protection, not due process. The plaintiff would have 
to hire a lawyer and attempt to prove, through discovery, that 
he was dismissed because he was Jewish. Challenging the 
soundness of the academic evaluation before the school 
in a due process hearing will not likely 








unfitness is made out because the student scored straight 60's 
on all exams, the inquiry ends. It is exactly that charge 
that a court cannot evaluate. 
By way of analogy, in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 
(1970), welfare recipients were entitled to hearings to 
challenge their reclassification on the basis of findings as 
to need. (The timing of the hearing is irrelevant to the 
present discussion.) If the administrative decisionmaker had 
satisfactory grounds for his decision as to need, the task of 
a court reviewing for due process violations would be at an 
end. In the academic sphere, the court must accept the 
decisionmaker's academic evaluation, since the court cannot 
make one of its own. Hence, no due process goal is served by 
requiring a hearing. If a teacher is so ingenuous as to say 
in the hearing, "He score, 100% on the exam, but I flunked him 
because he's a Jew; Jews simply don't make good doctors," 
there would not even be the facade of an academic dismissal. 
Due process would not really be the issue; equal protection 
would. 
Respondent tries to avoid the reach of the courts' 
inability to evaluate academic "factfinding" by characterizing -
her dismissal as disciplinary. She claims that the school 
, - ......._.. ~- ...__ ----
dropped her because she was late to class, sloppy, and 
unpleasant - disciplinary features. But in the school's view 
these are all part of the ability to perform as a practicing 
physician - an academic judgment. (See attached pages of the 









practical and clinical aspects.) Morover, the ultimate 
~ " decision rested on the purely academic evaluations by the J:::----- ......__ 
special committee of seven who tested her in each area of - -clinical competence and found her deficient. Thus, factual -inquiries into whether Respondent really was habitually late 
are beside the point. 
The Court could derive from its Eldridge analysis a 
rule,~-~-, the only process in the case of a student 
threatened with academic dismissal is notice, perhaps in some 
reasonable time frame,~-~-, enough forewarning to permit 
improvement. Under such a minimal process rule, Respondent 
clearly received more process than was due. 
IV 
Whatever Amount Is Minimum, This Exceeded It 
The Court could refrain from announcing a definite 
rule as to the constitutional minima in the academic due 
process area, but conclude that whatever it is, this exceeds 
it. She got plenty of process, including a special exam made ---------- -
up for her benefit. 
Starting from the beginning and observing 
Respondent's truculence toward those who, on the record, were 
seeking to help her, it seems as though she was determined to 
et expelled. Further, she misrepr esents the record in order 
to minimize the degree to which the school went out of its way 
to help her. For that reason, I'll review the events in some 







summarizing the points covered in a discussion he had had with 
Horowitz a few days earlier. He warned her that she was on 
academic probation and explained that a doctor must have not 
only knowledge, but also "high standards of personal conduct. 
The absence of either is incompatible with combined progress 
and graduation." App. 181. Thus, Respondent's hint {at Resp. 
Br. 9) that she was without notice that her deficiencies might 
lead to dismissal is somewhat disingenuous. 
In the fall of 1972, there were more meetings. She 
was advised that her clinical performance still was a cause of 
concern. On December 26, 1972, the Council on Evaluation - a 
----faculty-student body charged with evaluating academic 
performance - met to consider whether Respondent had made the 
improvements required by the Dean's letter in July. The 
Council recommended that Respondent be continued on probation 
and not permitted to graduate the following June. The final 
sentence of the recommendation again brings home the imminent 
possibility of dismissal: "The student may choose to remain 
at the UMKC School of Medicine until June 1, 1973, but may not 
continue beyond that date unless there is radical improvement 
in the following areas: clinical competence, peer and patient 
relations, personal hygiene, and ability to accept 
criticism." App. 18. Respondent was informed of these 
conclusions at a meeting with her docent, the Dean, and the 
Council chairman in January 1973. The conclusions were 











In that letter, once again, Respondent was warned that she had 
to make the necessary improvements "or you will not be able to 
continue in the Medical School after May of this year." 
Hence, there clearly was notice of the "charges" against 
~
Respondent and the possible outcome of dismissal. This letter 
.:.- -
also offered Respondent the option of the special clinical 
exam by the seven doctors. 
She took that option, and the Dean arranged for the 
exam. He informed Respondent that each doctor would prepare 
"a careful written statement of his recommendations and the 
reasons for his recommendations. The recommendations of your 
examining panel will then go to the Council on Evaluation. 
That Council will make its recommendations to the Coordinating 
Committee." App. 186-187. Contrary to Respondent's 
assertions, then, she had no particular expectancy of a 
special tabulation system, a binding majority vote of the 
panel, or a full panel discussion of her performance. Resp. 
I 
Br. 44-45. She was entitled to, and got, evaluation by each 
of the doctors, on which the Council acted. 
Two of the doctors recommended that she be 
dismissed. App. 195-196, 201-204. One recommended that she 
not be graduated and that dismissal be considered at the end 
of May. App. 199-200. One declared that she was not 
qualified to graduate, but refused to given an opinion about 
other alternatives. App. 194. One recommended another year 






par, but recommended giving her a degree since her failures 
may have been the school 's fault for admitting her in the 
first place. App. 191. Finally, one doctor thought that she ~ 
was competent and ought to graduate. App. 199. These 
recommendations were kept confidential and submitted to the 
Council on Evaluat i on. 
On May 1, the Council met and recommended that 
Respondent not be graduated. On May 7, the Coordinating 
Committee - a facu l ty body with review power over the Counci l 
- met and sustained the Council's recommendation. The Council 
on Evaluation met again on May 14 and resolved that unless 
Respondent's final semester clinical evaluations showed 
dramatic improvement, she would be dismissed. App. 20-21. 
On May 18, the Dean sent Respondent another letter. 
It summarized the discussion Respondent had had with the Dean, 
her docent, and the Council chairman on May 7. She was told 
that the Council had concluded on the basis of her special 
exam that she could not graduate. The letter also advised he r 
that "the Council on Evaluation wi l l be considering the extent 
to wh i ch you have improved your performance du r ing this 
academic year." App. 188. The clear import of that statement 
is that if her last-semester evaluations did not show 
--
i mprovement, she would be dismissed • 
The May 25, 1973 repor t on Respondent's fina l 
cl i nical r otation gave her an "unsatisfactory" in 9 out of 
~ 
/lb/>4Y+-




10 categories. On May 28, the Council met and decided on 
dismissal. The Coordinating Committee accepted that 
r ecommendation on June 4, and on July 3, the Dean told 
Respondent of the decision. App. 21-22, 1 89. 
14. 
.,-, '{ Considering this sequence of events, it is obvi ous 
~ ~ I that Respondent had practically a year's not i ce of the 
~ "charges" and the possible outcome. She had frequent meetings 
with the Dean and the chairman of the Council and was able to 
present her views to them. She was offered a special exam 
conducted by doctors who had had no previous contact with her, 
as a check on the information received through other 
-
-
channels. The only procedure not accorded her was a hearing 
before the Council on the Committee. Not only would that 
seems superfluous in l i ght of her contact with the Dean, her 
docent, and the Council chairman, but the record shows that 
she never requested any such hearing, App. 17, 95, even though 
she knew they wou l d be meeting to discuss her future. Since a 
hearing likely would not have developed any "facts" - i.e., 
non-academic judgments - a court would be qualified to assess 
anyway, it could be said that Respondent got far more 
procedural protection that what was strictly due. 
Respondent also claims that the school violated its 
own procedures by failing to call her before the Council on 
Evaluation. In December 1972, the Provost had c i rculated a 
memor andum relating to evaluat i on of students. It provided 





(by clinical teachers), quarterly exams, and docent 
recommendations. If the Council could not glean enough 
information from those sources, it was supposed to call the 
student for an interview. (This memo is part of the record, 
15. 
but is not in the Appendix.) Respondent alleges that the 
Council did find itself forced to look to outside information 
- the special exam results. Hence, she says it had a duty to 
call her. 
First, she never asked to be called. Second, the 
Council apparently thought it had plenty of information (all 
negative). It acted in December, telling Respondent she could 
not graduate in May. It made the special exam available at 
Respondent's option, as a form of appeal procedure. Since it 
had enough data, it did not have to seek an interview, even 
under the Provost's plan. 
Whatever the minimum amount of process due, ~ 
Respondent can be held to have received more, unless that ~ 
minimum includes a hearing. 
V. 




The absurdity of Respondent's claim becomes manifest 
when one examines the structure of authority in the medical 
school. The Council on Education, a combined student-faculty 
body, evaluated each student's progress and made 
recommendations to the Coordinating Committee, which consisted 






decisons were then reviewed by the Dean, who had the ultimate 
authority with respect to advancement and graduation. App. 51. 
By her own admission, Respondent met several times with the 
Dean to discuss her problems. Thus, she was entirely free to 
present whatever arguments or evidence she chose to the 
ultimate decisionmaker. Moreover, her docent and the chairman 
of the Council on Evaluation were present at those meetings. 
She was free to present whatever arguments or rebuttal 
evidence she wished in response to their reports of the 
Council and Committee recommendations. In view of these 
• 
facts, I find puzzling CA8's statement that she "was never Cf}2 ~ 
~ 
given a chance to appear before the Council on Evaluation, the 
Coordinating Committee or the Dean for a hearing during the 
dismissal procedure .. It App. 53 (emphasis added.) I 
suppose they must mean "hearing" in the sense of a trial-type 
procedure, with complete confrontation, cross-examination, 
etc. It is not clear how those trial-type procedures would 
aid in clarifying academic judgments. 
The University did not raise this issue. It disturbs 
me a bit that the University has not pressed what appear to be 
the two narrowest grounds for reversal (this one and the one 
discussed in Part VI). Still, I don't think that I overlooked 







Respondent's Failure to/ Request a Hearing 
Even assuming arguendoZat a state school must 
provide a trial-type hearing before dismissing a student, 
Respondent here never Although the school's 
academic plan did not provide for hearings, it did not 
prohibit them, either. And there is some evidence that if a 
student had ever asked to be present, that request might have 
been honored. (This implication comes from the testimony of 
Respondent's witness). App. 95. It is not apparent why a 
state agency should have to summon a student or employee 
before it for a hearing, if the student or employee himself 
does not seek one. 
Respondent is no fool. She had counsel at least as 
early as the July 1973 meeting at which the Dean told her of 
her dismissal. App. 128. If she had thought that a hearing 
would have improved her chances, she would have asked for one. 
It is true that in Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 
Eldridge's failure to request a pretermination hearing was 
held not to bar his suit. But the reason given there was that 
the Secretary had established an elaborate set of procedures 
already, and there was no reason to believe he would have 
honored a hearing request from an isolated recipient. 424 
U.S. at 329-330. In this case, there is no reason to indulge 






by creating an entirely new procedure - the special exam - for 
Respondent. Moreover, the Provost's memorandum indicated that 
a student's appearance before the Council could occur. 
Finally, there were no elaborate or fixed procedures of any 
kind suggesting that a hearing request would be futile. 
Codd v. Velger, supra, suggests that the Court will 
not force state agencies to hold hearings for their inherent 
therapeutic effect; the injured party must plead some harm. 
It is difficult to see why Respondent should be permitted to 
claim that she was harmed by the lack of a hearing, when she 
apparently never felt one was necessary to stave off the 
harm. Perhaps litigation would have been avoided entirely if 
she had requested one. 
The University does not raise this issue, either. 
Given the messiness of this area of the law, the Court might 
do well not to let the parties push it to a broad decision. 
VII 
The seventh approach to this case is, of course, that 'Jt..,,.-t-' 
of CAB. It has been criticized in the course of considering ~ 













search co rhe above ment i0ntd knowledge and it~ 
importance ro the aJvar . .:emcnt of knowledge. 
d. A specific profile for his fur ther education based 
upon his fund of_ infor mation, his capacity fo r 
learning, and a general understanding of his ro le 
as a profession?.!. 
4. Although made individual b)' srudcnr opabiliry and 
interest, the scudenc gcne~ally will get from th irty 
ro fifty percen t of his coral experience Jirtctly in rhc 
care system under the suF:0·ision of a doccm. Thi, 
will be Kcomplishcd br a r,:dvc-wcck c:xpc~ic.nce 
each yc:Jr on the cwcnty-!:-cd gcncr.d med ic ine ser-
vice plu, a continuing , ~-cu round, four-year, re-
sponsibility for outp2ticnr follow-up visits. During 
these four years of chc p:ogra m, the stud ent will 
m aintain outNrienr rcs5onsibility fo r che patients 
first met durin g his tw: lvc-wcck , yearl y general 
medicine service. He •.v iii schedule these patients, 
and maintain office hou·, as needed co give pro· 
fcssion:i l service to his •·puctice." Specifica lly, he 
will continue to follo w his prac tice over a four-
year pe riod, fortr-eight weeks a year, with appro-
priate supc:rvi,ion. 
5. T he evalu ation of facru :?! information acquire<! by 
studen;:s will be done on a ch ,dlcnge ex~min.uion 
system. The studen t will be al lowed to progress to 
more :idnnlcJ responsibili ty on an individual basis 
in accord with his abiEcy co perform borh factually 
and clinicallr . 
6. Experi ence in the specialties as -such, borh in basic 
science and cliniol fields. will he n:quircd bur the 
selection of fields will be by the student as dc,·cloped 
through the counseling of rh:: docent. FJ:ni ly prac-
tice and community health ac tivit ies will be con-
sidereJ as sre..:i.~!ci :::s. 
7. Standards fo r faccu :d ~e<; uin.:mcnr- will b.: v.01 kc,! 
out by teams of incc r-di ,cipline :ind inter-univers ity 
g roups. 
8 
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B. 
~..,-~;:: 
8. T he curriculum will rclacc hc:i-.il)f co rhe commun-
icy hospi ra!s, neighborhood he~!ch center,, che main 
camr,us of chc Univcrsitr of ~fissouri-Kansas City, 
ct ccrc:ra. 
9. We: cnnsider first-cl ass residencies as an inn:gr1l part 
c f a first-class medical scho0l. \Ve recognize t he 
continuity of medical educat i0n and chat che medi-
~ al student and rcsidrnt are s-:paratcd onlr by time 
and experience. A key factor in th e open medic?.] 
school concept is a coorJinaceJ medica l residency, 
sham-I anJ clirccced by a ll p1riciparing hospids. In 
m aking chc.:se comments about a residenq ir. medi-
cine we do not di scou nt the r.ujor role of alJ fields 
of praccice; we but indicate our conviction that the 
basic discipline of a dcp.trtm en r of mc.:dicine is the 
cducacion and care core of Medicine. 
10. In addi rion tO the classical o, cu~tomary sh ore ccrm 
courses of continuing medic:il education, we plan 
"m residence'' loni;er-tcrm expc:ricncc for practic-
ing physicians. The value of rhtse men co the OYer-
a!l cc:aching prngram shouL:l be considerable, return-
ing :1.s rhey will be from pncrice. Funher, the visit-
ing ceacher program will be a major re,ource of 
reach ing taknr and will be designed so the.: com-
munity's ronrinuing ed~10, ;--. n pr(1gra m, are coor-
d inated wirh t he medical school curriculum, and 
che planned cu rr iculum of the u nd,rgraduar:: ,ru-
dcnt w ill uti lize the visit of rhesc nation:dly-known 
teachers , whose efforts arc u sua l ly confined ro t he 
po,t,i:raduare programs. 
11. A cadre of education professiomls ( no r necessa rily 
phpicians ) will be included and will functi o n as 
staff co the dean's office and ro rhe Councils (infra 
vide). 
Information Resources 
1. This p~ogr~in will draw heavil)' upon organized 
res~1rch at th :: regional, nir io nal, and U niver-
sity-wide kvtl in inform1:io n sciences, "reaching 
9 





























D . To f ... · ,c'np a niodcI of uni\·crsiry-c0q1munity coopcr:i• 
1io:1, .... her:: c:,1d1 corn1,oncnr provides those progr:rn1s 
of sr,cill concern and inrcrcst to ir. 
E. To pro,·idc: the srudc:nt with a rclev1nr clinician or b:1sic 
science modd with which he can ider.t ify and ro which 
he can a,pirc: and from whom he c.,n receive personal 
guidan,c in rhc shaping of his eJucarional program. 
IV. Oper:iting Conditions 
In light of the assumptions and gnals state,! abo\c· , the 
medica I school progra!n has been design~! to meet the fol-
lowing OfX'D[ing condition,: 
A. St\ldcnts, Faculty, Curriculum 
I. Srudencs will be grouped in sections of rwc1vc: wirh 
three students from each mediol schoo l class in 
the group. 
2. T he docents will have the prir:ury responsibility 
for the application or lirting of the curriculum to 
the individu:d studcnr. The actual pla nning of the 
curriculum :ind rhe majority of the teaching will be 
c:uric:d out by the gc:n~cal fa,ult~·-
3. The st udent's b,se for operations wil l be in rh e 
medio l school scrr ing containing his office, chose 
of his fellow srudr.:nts, and the doccnr ream. He 
will conscancly oper:itc our of chis area, but it wil l 
remain his base of operations. In chis setting he wi ll 
develop: 
a. A per;.pcccivc of the health care system from the 
patient's point of view as a mcmb<'r of the com-
m uniry . 
b. An u nderstanding of the sources of knowled ge 
necessary for applicacio n to rhc nc:cds of chc p1-
~ This knowledge ma)' b:'. drawn from Uni-
vcrsit)' dcparcm cn cs, clinical disciplines, and a 
\·ar iery of inf..-,, mJrion rc:s01,r ... ts. 
c. A cruc ap1,rc.:c i,uion of t he relati onship of re.:-
7 
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(or orh er healrh science ca reers) durir:g che ini t ial 
tri al yea rs 3nd srurlrn ts will b, acrivcly cncour1ged 
to rr.1n sfcr in fr om o rhcr pre-med ica l erlu cacion 
background , . If possib le, ho"cver, rhc six-year p ro-
gram wi ll offer a double degree upon completion : 
a Bachelo r's and a Doctorate . 
2. Medical school curriculum wi ll be forrr-e ig hr '.vt:eks 
C'Ach year for rh rcc years ; chirry-six weeks for a 
fourth year. 
3. Basic rrunl: of rhe four year medica l school curri cu'. 
Jum will be rhc genera l medic., ! service, under g uid-
ance of :i docent ream. Th is genera l med ical expn-
iencc will be based on rwdvc week ,ervice o f d1ily 
ward rou nds, ca::h }eJ r, ,v irh rlic same doccnr re:im. 
During the rennindcr o f eJc i;i yea r the sru ,!cnc will 
conti nue ro mainui n ou tpa tien t res ponsibility fo r 
the paricn rs met d uri ng rhc rwclve week general 
medica l ser vice. H e wi ll sched ule t hese ap poi nr-
mcnrs and maint~in "oflice hours" a~ neeJ cd co g ive 
profess ional ad ,·i::e to h is "prJcricc" and to sec rhc 
fa m il r complex surrounding che p.Hicnr. (Figure 3) 
His " prJcticc" "il l be under che cont inuing super-
vision of rhc docen t sraff. 
4. This p1rient ex perience will serve a.~ the case histo,..,. 
dat., b.m for rhc ind ividu:i l srudent. E,m·nsions from 
this case hisro: r ba,e wi ll pro vide rhc guidelin(·s fo r 
che st udent 's needed in fo r mJ rion in rite basic sci-
ences rnd sub-S j)C:C iJ ltics, and approximate ly scvcn ry-
five percent o f h is time will be dcYorcd to lcg uir-
ing rhis bas ic in for rnarion, over a four-)' Ca r period. 
The docen t bea rs ch e rcsponsibil iry of complcrin3 
the bas ic science base of rhc scudcnc's medica l ed- . 
ucarion. This base kn0wlcdi;c, beh'lln in high schcol, 
added to in r ears one and two, will of cou rse, no r 
be caug ht solely by rhe doce nts, bur b )' mem-
bers o f hi s re:i m and hy an)' hcu :t)' resource as de-
15 
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fin ed by the Counci l on Curriculum. T his in,rruc-
tion "·ill be nut only in the quarcer of rime 3s,igncd 
co gener1l medicine bur throughout rhe orhcr quar-
ters. 
5. Throughout the four years, rhc studen t will have ap-
ptoximatdy twenty-fi ,·e percent of hi s time avail-
able for continuing his libenl arts education. An 
equal amount of exr ~ricn-::e in th e specialties of 
medicine will be ckn;vely avdihble under docc:nr 
counsel. Co mmuni,y health :u:tivit) ,,ill be con-
siderl"d a spcci ,It:· . 
6. \X'hcre possible, lcuning v:ill be accomplished in 
the studenr-doccnt 3rca; the teaching will come co 
the sn:denr. Liberal :.res credit expe rience will be 
arranied wl,en pos,ib'.e as small group ,emiPars, in 
the studenr-docenr a,ca. Hrn:e,-er, it is apprcciared 
that the smdent ,;,:ill h:ne cLt , sroom cxpuiencc on 
the main Univc:rsir:· c:1mpus throughou r th e four 
mediol years , year t~rc:c. fou r, five, and six. 
7. E.ch twelve-srucknt d..:iccnr unir will be compo, ed 
of an cqu ?l mi·qure of srudcnts from eJch of rhe 
classes. Thu , the r,·elvc-man ream will hwe rhrce 
stuJenrs from each year shuing th e rwdve-wcek 
genera l medical exp::ricncc, rhr0ughout the four 
rears. 
8. A docent team consists of the docent, associare 
docents, visiting docent, outpat ient ph rsicians, resi-
dents, related nursi ng. phHmacy, ariJ ancillary per-
sonnel , n:brcd res::2 rch and cliniol laboruories, ap-
pr,,xim~ tely twenty inpatient b~ds, and outp.tt ient 
facil ities for geneDl medicine: pnients, and four 
teams, twelve each. of srndcnts and their personal 
offices, discussion room, and laborator)' . Figures 4 
th rough 7, plus their legends, develop in deuil the 
docent conccpr. 
9. A stutknr " i!l h:ve hi s own oflicc:, oprn ro h ir.1 
twenty-four hours a day for the full four yc.irs. It 
16 
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J U STI C E POTTER S TEWART 
fe>uµrtntt {!Jllltt± llf t~ %rift~ $5faus 
Ji[a:s-!rmgton. ~ . QJ:. 2.0',?.l!.;l 
January 19, 1978 
No. 76-695, Bd. of Curators Univ. of Mo. 
v. Horowitz 
Dear Bill, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the 
Court in this case. 
Sincerely ·yours, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 










- -rdc 1/19/78 
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: Bob 
/ 
RE: Justice Rehnquist's Draft in Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 
No. 76-695 
This is the case of the woman who daims to have been 
dismissed from medical school because she is ugly. 
On my first reading of the draft, I was somewhat distressed 
at Justice Rehnquist's failure to emphasize the fact that Horowitz 
repeatedly met with the Dean -- her ultimate decisionmaker --
over the course of her second year. I had the impression that 
the opinion deliberately omitted mention of these meetings so 
that it could reach the broader ground of distinguishing be-
tween academic and disciplinary dismissals. My original feeling 
was that it was unnecessary to draw that distinction (and rather 
cavalierly to dismiss Horowitz's contention that her dismissal 
actually was disciplinary, see footnote 6), since no matter 
how her dismissal was characterized, it could be said that the 
received many Goss-type hearings in front of her ultimate 
decisionmaker. 
Further reflection, however, suggests that perhaps Justice 
ehnquist was forced into this approach by the permanent nature 
of the dismissal here, which might require more procedural pro-
tections than those contemplated by 29ss, if the dismissal were 






characterized as disciplinary. (For example, the more serious 
result might entail the right of cross-examination, etc., in 
a disciplinary hearing.) Thus, the academic distinction probably 
had to be drawn. It seems well drawn to me, see esp. p.11. 
I still think that some mention of the repeated informal 
hearings she got with the Dean would be helpful. In particular, 
it might help support the final conclusion (p. 13) that there 
is no need for a remand on the question whether the dismissal 
was arbitrary and capricious. 
Also, I think the discussion beginning with the first 
full paragraph on p. 5 and running over top. 6 is dictum 
that may have unwanted repercussions. It suggests that there 
could be no liberty interest infringed by a dismissal without 
"publicization," whatever that means in the real world. But 
as Justice Rehnquist indicates in footnote 1, it may be that 
publicization is i nevitably "on the cards" for an academic 
deprivation. At any rate, since the Court in the very next 
breath -- p. 6 -- finds it unnecessary to decide whether there 
was any property interest here, it is also unnecessary to 
hint broadly that there was none. 
- - / 
January 19, 1978 
No. 76-695 Curators v. Horowitz 
Dear Bill: 
In taking a quick look at your opinion (which I 
will in all probability join}, I wonder whether you have 
not elevated the type of "hearing" required by Goss? 
As your footnote 2 states, all that Byron's 
opinion required was an "informal give and take" - which, 
as I pointed out in dissent, probably was less than the 
Ohio statute required or than was customarily afforded 
pupils. 
As I suppose I also think that being "flunked out" 
of a graduate school is far more serious than being 
suspended for 24 hours, I would be incllned to accord a 
good deal more formality than a single exchange of 
viewpoints with an academic dean. I enclose some language 
that might be used as a substitute for several of the 
sentences on page 7. This is pretty rough, and if you 
accept the essence of it perhaps some other language 
changes would be necessary. 
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.:§.uprtnu {!Jttttrl irf tlft~~ ;§hdtll' 
Jfznr.fringhttt. ~- QJ. 20ffe'1, 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
January 20, 1978 
Re: 76-695 - Board of Curators v. Horowitz 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 




j;np-rtmt (!Jaurt af t~t ~ b j;ta±ts 
1llas-lth4ltan. J. <!J. 2llffe'!.;t ✓ 
CHAMBER S O F 
J U S T ICE THURGOOD MARS H ALL 
January 20, 1978 
Re: No. 76-695, Board of Curators v. Horowitz 
Dear Bill, 
While I agree with the result reached in your opinion, 
I believe that the opinion sweeps too broadly. By any 
standard, Ms. Horowitz received adequate process. Hence we 
need not decide here whether it is appropriate (or even 
possible) to distinguish between the disciplinary and the 
academic contexts and to accord less due process protection 
in the latter context. 
I plan to concur in the judgment and in due course 
will circulate an opinion along the above lines. 
Sincerely, 
T.M. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
~;w -if ,,/,,:.,~ ~ /,U,J_,,J__, ~ ~ 
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~rurqington. ~ . C!f. 2D.;i'!~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM.J . B R ENNAN, J R. 
January 23, 1978 
RE: No. 76-695 Board of Curators v. Horowitz 
Dear Bi 11: 
I share Thurgood's reservation and will await 
his opinion. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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✓ 
-
CHAMBERS O F 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
-
.;§u:pr.ttttt Qlami af tlf t ~ t h .:§ut±tg 
... asqingLm. ~- QI. 2llpJ.1~ 
January 23, 1978 
Re: No. 76-695 - Board of Curators v. Horowitz 
Dear Thurgood: r 
Thank you for your note of January 20th, indiciting that 
you will circulate a separate opinion concurring on narrower 
grounds. In drafting the opinion, I felt we could not simply 
say as you - say in shorthand form in your note that "by any 
standard, Ms. Horowitz received adequate process" without 
going into some detail as to the reasoning which led us to 
that conclusion. Thus my effort to discuss some of the facts 
and legal principles which I thought justified the result 
which we all agree should be reached. 
Sincerely~ 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
CH.AMBERS or 




,ju:p-i-mt~ <!f1tttrt of t!r~ ~th ,jtaug 
JJ'agfrington. ~. <!f. 2!lffeJ!.~ 
-
January 23, 1978 
Board of Curators of the University 
of Missouri v. Charlotte Horowitz, 
#76-695 
I shall await Thurgood's concurrence. 
Sincerely, 
A~ 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
- -
~n:µrtnu (!Ill1trl .ttf tlft ~ ~brlu 
~agltittghm, ~ - (!I. 2.ll.;i'!, 
CHAMBERS O F 
JUSTIC E J O HN PAUL STEVEN S / 
January 24, 1978 
Re: 76-695 - Curators v. Horowitz 
Dear Bill: 
The change suggested by Lewis is fine with me. 
Respectfully, 
Mr. Justice Reh nq uist 
Copies to Mr. Just i ce Stewart 
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C HAMBERS OF ✓ 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
January 24, 1978 
Re: No. 76-695 - Curators v. Horowitz 
Dear Lewis: 
I submitted your draft language in Rider A attached to 
your letter to me dated today verbatim to Potter and John, 
who had already joined the pres Pntly circulating draft. They 
have each said they have no objection to its substitution for 
the present text, and therefore I have sent to the printer 
a second draft in which your language will appear verbatim 
on page 7 as a substitute for the two sentences which presently 
begin " The Court of Appeals apparently concluded ••• " and 
end with the citation to Cafeteria Workers. The following 
sentence in the present draft, in order to accommodate your 
language, would then read: 
"This difference calls for far less stringent 
procedural requirements in the case of an 
academic dismissal. 1./" 
The footnote reference would be to existing footnote 3 on page 8 
of the presently circulating draft. 
'A( with Needless to say, I have done this on the assumption that this proposed change you will join the revised draft. 
Sincerely ~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
CHAMBERS O F 
T H E CH I E F JUSTICE 
- -;§u.pumt C!Jllttrl Llf tltt ~~ ;§utftg 
Jhullp:nghtn. ~ - QJ. 2llffe'!~ 
January 25, 1978 
✓ 




Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to Conference 
Rt;, f) 
Bill: 
Please join, me. 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
-- ..§u.p-r.tnu ~curl of tlt.t ~~ ~fat.ts 
... ~~ ~- ~- 2.llgi'!, 
CHAMBERS 01' 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN January 30, 1978 
/ 
Re: No. 76-695 - Board of Curators v. Horowitz 
Dear Bill: 





Mr. Justice Rehnquist 






MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: Bob DATE: 2/6/78 
RE: Justice Marshall's concurrence in Horowitz, 76-695 
I think Justice Marshall does some damage to WHR's 
opinion for the Court, primarily because of WHR's refusal 
-- which we have discussed before -- to include any of the 
wealth of facts that indicate precisely how much process 
Horowitz actually got. TM's recounting of those facts makes 
it appear as though WHR went out of his way to hide them, so 
that this opinion could stand for a broader proposition 
than it has to. 
Coupled with this "hidden ball play" is the lingering 
intimation that less process is required for an academic 
dismissal than was required in Goss. WHR adopted your sug-
gested language on this point, but he did it in such a way 
that pp. 7-8 still indicate that the Goss-type give-and-take 
is more than the Due Process Clause requires in the case of 
a permanent academic sismissal. 
The rest of Justice Marshall's opinion, as you can tell 
from my marginalia, struck me as less persuasive. 
If it is not too late, it might be in the interest of 
a sound Court opinion to remonstrate with WHR over the inclusion 
of a narrative tracking TM's pp. 2-3. This should be followed 






the context of a permanent academic dismissal -- vis-a-vis 
Goss -- this was clearly more than enough. Note that it 
2. 
I~ 
would still be necessary to distinguish academic from discipl1nar~ 
dismissals, Gince otherwise a more formal, adversary hearing 
would seem to be called for. This is the point TM glosses ov 
Thus, a suggestion along these lines would not depriv~ 
WHR of the opportunity to establish some distinction between 
academic and disciplinary dismissals, which is all he seems 
concerned about now. It would make his opinion much more 
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MR. JusTICE MARSHALL, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
I agree with the Court that, " [al ssuming the existence of a 
liberty or property interest, respondent has been awarded at 
least as much due process as the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires." A1ite, at 6. I cannot join the Court's opinion, 
however, because it contains dictum suggesting that respondent 
was entitled to even less procedural protection than she 
received. I also differ from the Court in its assumption that 
characterizatio11 of the reasons for a dismissal as "academic" 
or "disciplinary'' is relevant to resolution of the question of 
what procedures are required by the Due Process Clause. 
Finally, I disagree with the Court's decision not to remand to 
the Court of Appeals for consideration of respondent's sub-
stantive due process claim. 
I 
We held in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975). that 
"due process requires. in connection with a suspension of 
10 days or less. that the student he given oral or written 
notice of the charges against him and. if he denies them, 
an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and 
an opportunity to present his side of .the story." Id., at 
581. 
76-695-CONCUR & DISSENT 
2 BOARD OF CURATORS UNIV. OF MO. v. HOROWITZ 
There is no question that respondent received these protec-
tions. and more.1 
According to the stipulation of facts filed in the District 
Court. respondent had a "discussion" with the dean of the 
medical school in mid-1972, at the close of her first year in 
school. during which she was notified of lwr unsatisfactory 
performance.~ The df'an testifif'd that he explained the 
nature of her problems to respondent twice at this meeting. 
so that she would fully undf'rstand tlwm. 3 A letter from the 
,dean followed shortly thereafter. in ,Yhich respondent was 
advised that she was being placed on probation because of. 
inter a.1-ia, "a ma.ior deficiency" in her "relationships with 
others." and her failure to "keep ... to established schedules" 
and "attend ... carefu11y to personal appearance." 4 The 
dean again met with respondent in October 1972 "to call atten-
tion in a direct and supportive way to the fact that her per-
formance ,Yas not then strong." 5 
In January 1973. there was stil1 another meeting between 
respondent and the dean. who was accompanied by respond-
ent's docent and the chairman of the Council on Evaluation. 
Respondent was there notified of the Council's recommenda-
tion that she not graduate and that she be dropped from 
school unless there was "radical improvement'' in her "clinical 
competence. peer and patient relations. personal hygiene. and 
ability to accept criticism."" A letter from the dean again 
1 It is necessa r~· to recount tlw fact s unclerl~·ing thi::: conclusion in some 
detail, because the Court '::: opinion doe::-: not provide the relevnnt facts with 
regard to the notice and opportunity to reply given to respondent. 
2 App. 15. It i,- likely tlrnt re:;pondent was Jr:;::-: formally notified of these 
defieienrir" ~c,·er:11 month" r arlier, in }Iarch 1972. See id., at 100-101 
·(testimony of respondent ',- docenL) . 
3 ld .. at 146. 
4 Id., at. 15-16. 
5 Td., nt. 147. 
6 Tel., at. 18. 
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followed the meeting; the letter summarized respondent's 
problem areas aud noted that tlwy had been discussed with 
her "several times." 7 
These meetings and letters pl.ainly gave respondent all that ·~ 
Goss requires: several notices and explanations. and at least 
three opportunities "to present [her] side of the story." 419 
U. S .. at 581. I do not read the Court's opinion to disagree 
with this conclusion. Hence I do not [!nderstand why the 
Court indicates that even the "informal give-and-take" man~ 
dated by Goss, id., at 584. need not have been provided here. 
See ante, at 7-8. 11-12. This case simply provides no legiti-
mate opportunity to consider whether "far less stringent pro-
cedural requirements," id., at 7-8. than those required in Goss 
are appropriate in other school contexts. While T disagree V 
with the Court's conclusion that "far less" is adequate. as 
discussed infra, it is equally disturbing that the Court decides ~ 
an issue not presented by fJiecase75e1ore us. As M~e 
Brancle1s warne over years ago. t 1e great gravity and 
delicacy' " of our task in constitutional cases should cause us 
to "'shrink'" from "'anticipat[ing] a question of constitu-
tional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' '' and 
from "'formulat[ing] a rule of constitutional law broader 
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be 
applied.' " Ashwander "· Tl' A, 297 t;". S. 288. 345-347 (1936) 
(concurring opinion) . 
JI 
In view of the Court's dictum to the effect that even the 
minimum procedures required in Goss need not have been 
provided to respondent. I feel compelled to comment on the 
extent of procedural protection mandated here. I do so 
within a framework largely ignored by the Court. a frame-
work derived from our traditional approach to these problems. 
According to our prior decisions, as summarized in JI![ athews V, 
1 /cl., at. 182-183. 
7 
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. • ' • . 1 
Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976), three factprs are of principal 
Televance in determining what process is due: 
"First, the private interest that will be affected by the 
official action; second. the risk of an erroneous depriva;-
tion of such interest through the procedures used. and 
the probable value. if any. of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and finally. the Government's 
interest. including the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the additional or sub-
stitute procedural requirement would entail." Id., at 
335. 
As the Court recognizes. the "private interest" involved 
l1ere is a weighty one: "the deprivation to which respondent 
was subjected-dismissal from a. graduate medical school-
was more severe than the 10-day suspension to which the hig_h 
school students were subjected in Goss." Ante. at 8 n. 3. 
One example of the loss suffered by respondent is contained in 
the stipulation of facts: respondent had a job offer from the 
psychiatry department of another university to begin work .in 
September 1973; the offer was contingent on her receiving the 
M. D. degree.s In summary. as the Court of Appeals noted: 
"The unrefuted evidence here .establishes that .Horowitz 
has been stigmatized by her dismissal in such a way 
that she will be unable to ~ontinue her medical educatioi1. 
and her chances of returning to employment in a meqi:-
cally related field are severely damaged.'' 538 F. 2d 
1317. 1321 (CA8 1976). 
,As Judge Friendly has written in a related conte~t, when the 
State seeks "to deprive a person of a way of life to which 
ls]he has devoted years of preparation and on which [s]h~ .. . 
ha[s] come to rely." it should be required first to provide a 
"high level of procedural protection ."" 
s ld .. at 16. .~ 
(,t ".Friend!.\'. ' ·Some Kind of Hearing\'.' 12:3 G. Pa . L . R ev. 12(:ii, 1296-1297 
\}975) {revocation of J)rofe~clional liN'.n;:;e;;) . 
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Neither of the other two factors mentioned in Mathewg 
justifies moving from a high level to the lower level of 
protection involved in Goss. There was at least some risk 
of error inherent in the evidence on which the clean relied in 
his meetings v.,ith and letters to respondent; faculty evalua-
tions of such matters as personal hygiene and patient and 
peer rapport are neither as "sharply focused" nor as "easily 
documented " as was. e. g., the disability determination 
involved in Mathews, 424 U. S .. at 343. See Goss v. Lopez, 
supra, 419 U. S .. at 580 ( when clecisionmaker "act[s] on the 
reports and advice of others ... [t]he risk of error is not at 
al1 trivial") .10 
Nor can it be said that the university had any greater 
interest in summary proceedings here than did the school in 
Goss. Certainly the allegedly disruptive and disobedient 
students involved there, see id., at 569-571. posed more of 
an immediate threat to orderly school administration than did 
respondent. As we noted in Goss, moreover, "it disserves .. . 
the interest of the State if ,[ the student's] suspension is in fact 
unwarranted." ld. , at 579.11 Under these circumstances-
with respondent having much more at stake than did the 
students in Goss, the administration at best having no more at 
stake, and the meetings between respondent and the dea.n 
leaving some possibility of erroneous dismissal-I believe that 
respondent was entitled to more procedural protection tha.n is 
10 The inquiry about risk of error cannot be separated from the first 
inquiry about t.he private interest at stake : 
"The degree of risk of error deemed acceptable . . . is related to the 
seriousness of the consequences for the individual if an erroneous decision 
is made. . . . When . . . serious consequences are involved, procedures 
that substantially reduce the risk of error at low or no cost to the public 
&re manda.ted by the due process clause." B?!ck v. Board of Education, 
553 F. 2d 315, 323 (CA2 1977) (Oakes, J., dissenting), petition for oert. 
pending, No. 77-555. 
:n The statements ai1d letters of the medical school dean reflect :t 
g~n.uipe concern that respondent not l>e wrong.fcrify dis1missed. See ApJJ!. 
147-150, 180-183, 185-181'. 
-~- ;J 
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provided by "informal giYe-and-take" before the school could 
dismiss her. 
The contours of the a<lditional procedural protection to 
which respondent was entitled need not be defined in terms 
of the traditional ach-ersarial system so familiar to lawyers 
and judges. Sec Mathews v. Eldridge. supm, 424 1!. ~ .. at 
348. ,ve ha.vc emphasized many times that "rt"lhe very 
na.ture of due process negates any concrpt of i11fkxiblc pro-
ceclurrs uniYcrsally applicable to r,·cry imaginable' situation." 
Cafeteria Workers v. ]fcElroy, 367 U. S. 886. 8fl3 (Hl61): sec. 
e. g .. ante, at 7; Goss v. Lopez. supra. 4H) r. R .. at 578. Tn 
other words. what process is due will Yary "according to spe-
cific factual contexts." Han'llah Y. Lcirchc. 363 r. S. 420. 442 
(1960); sec. e. g., Mathews ,·. Eldridge , suwa. 424 F R .. at 
334: Morrissey Y. Breu·er, 408 r. S. 471. 481 (lfl72): Br.U v. 
Burson. 402 r. R. 53,j_ 540 (H)71). Rer also Jo1:11l .11nti-Fa.~c-ist 
Refugee Committee v. McGrath. 341 U. S. 123, 162- 163 
(1951) (Frankfurtrr. J .. concurring). 
In the instant factual contrxt the "appeal' ' pro,·idNI to ! 
respondent. sre ante. at 3. sen·ed the samr purpo~<'S as. and 
in some resprcts may haYe been lwtter than. a formal hearing. 
In establishing the procedure under which respo11cl<'nt was 
evaluated separately by seven phy~ 'lns who had had little 
or no previous contact \\' ith lwr. it appears that thr medical 
school placer! emphasis on obtaining "a fair and rwutral and 
impa.rtial assessment." ' ~ In order to r,·aluat<' rpspondPnt. 
each of the sevPn physicians spent approximately one half-
day observing her as she >crformcd various clinical duties and 
then suhmittc< a report on wr per ormancc to the clean} 3 
It is difficult to imagine a better procedure for drtermining 
whether the school's allrgations against respondent had any 
1 2 Jd., nt 150 (if',;timony of dean) : ~cc id .. nt 185, lSi. 208, 210 (l ctt~r~ 
to re,;pondent and ,;c,·cn phy,;icians),. 
1 3 Seo id., nL 190-207. 
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substance to them.H Cf. Mathews Y. Eldridge, supra, 424 
U. S .. at 337-338. 344 ( use of independent. physician to exam-
ine clisabili ty applicant and report to decision maker). I 
therefore believe that the appeal procedure utilized by · 
responclen t. together \Yith her earlier notices from and meet-
ings with the dean. provided ·respondent with as much pro-
cedural protection as the Due Process Clause requircs.1" 
III 
The analysis in Parts I and II of this opinion illustrates · 
that resolution of this case under our traditional approach 
does not turn on whether the dismissal of respondent is char-
acterized as one for "academic'' or "disciplinary'' reasons. In 
my view, the effort to apply sucn labels does little to advance 
the due process inquiry, as is iriclicated by examination of the 
fact~of t1IiscasC-
The minutes of the meeting at \\·hich it "·as first decided 
that respondent should not graduate contain the following: 
"This issue is not one of academic achievement, but of 
14 Re;;:pondcn1 nppenr;: to :irgue thnt her srx :ind her religion were under-
lying ren;:ons for hrr di,;mi~~nl and that a henring ,rould ha,·e helped to 
resolve the "f:wtunl di~Jrnte '' between her wd the school on thr~e is"'ues. 
Brief for Rr:;pondrnt, at 30 : sec id .. at 51-52. Sec al~o ante. :d 13 n. 7. 
But the on!~· Pxprr:;,.._· ground., for re~pond('ni 's di,-nli,-,-nl rrl:nPcl f o dPfic-iC'n-1 
cies in per;;onal hygienP, patit'nt rapport , and the like, and, a.,, a, matter 
of proceclmal due prore:::.-; , re,.;pondent wn., entitlrd to no more i han a 
fornm to contest the fact11al 11ndPrpinning,-; of thr,.:e grounck The nppeal 
procedure here gnve respondrnt ,;11ch a fornm-nn opportuni1y to demon-
strnte thnt the l"chool',; chargr,.: \\·err untrur. 
15 Like a ll<'aring, the nppenl procedure nnd the mrcling,.: 
"reprPsent[rd] ... a Yalued human inferaction in which thr affected 
per:,on experience[ d] at lea~t the ,mti,;faction of participating in the deci,.:ion 
that Yitally concrrn f f'd] her . . . . [Tl IH•,;e right~ to interehang<' ex pres.-, 
the elementary idea that to be n JJerson, rather than a thing, j,; at lra,-t to 
be consulted about what j,., donr with one." L . Tribe, American Con~titu-
tio)lal Law § 10-7, al 503 {1977) (empha,.;i,; in original) . 
~~ 
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performance. relationship to people and ability to COfii· 
municate." App. 218 ( emphasis added) . 
By the customary measures of academic progress. moreover. 
no deficiency was apparent at the time that the authorities 
decided respondent cou ld not graduate; prior to this time . 
according to the stipulation of facts. respondent had received 
"credit' ' and "satisfactory grades'' in all of her courses. includ ... 
in~ clinical courses. 1G 
It may nevertheless be true, as the Court implies. ante, at 
n 
1 ' 12 n. 6. that the school decided that respondent's inadequacies' i 
in such areas as 1ersonal hygiene. ~ r and patient relations, 
. and timeliness " ·oulc impair 1er ability to be "a good medical 
doctor." Whether these inadequacies can be termed "pure 
academic reasons." as the Court calls them. ibid ., is ultimately Nr."\ 
· an irrelevant question. and one placing an undue emphasis on · LJ 
words rather than functional considf'rations. The relevant ; _· ,1 f ~ 
point is that respondent was dismissed largely because of her ~
conduct. just as the students in Goss were suspen e because ...IJ . _ . 0 oTthcir CO 11 cl UC t.1 7 
The Court mak'es much of decisions from state and lower 
federal courts to support its point that "dismissals for 
academic ... cause do not necessitate a hearing.'' Ante, at 
9. The decisions on which the Court relies, however. plainly 
~c App. 12. Re;,pondent fa ter rrcehwl "no credit" for hrr emergency 
room rot:ition . ihe on!~· rour:-r in \\'hich her g-rade ,,·a,- IC':,::< than :,;atis. 
:Factory. Ibid. Thi:,: grndr w:1., not. rrrordrd . ~wrording- to the District 
Court., until after the deri,-ion had lwrn made that re,.;pond!c'nt ro11ld not 
graduate. Id .. nt. 31. When the Coordinating Commifkt' mnde thi::: deci~ 
sion, moreover, it . npparentlr lrnd not. ,seen nn~· eY:tluation of re,:pondent's 
emergenrr room performnnre. Sec id .. ni 229 (minute:-: of Coordinating 
Committee mreting-) . 
17 Only onr of th<' reasons \'Oiced b.,· the ,:chool for deriding not io 
graduate re,;pondcnt !ind :1ny arg-uable nor1ronduct n,.;ppef.,, and that. rea-
son, "clinical compctt>ncr," wa,; p lain!~· relat.rd to prrePi\'C'd deficiencic,- in 
respondent.',.; per:<onnl h~·giPne nnd rclat ion~hips with eolleaguc,,- and 
patients. Sec id., at ~IV. Sec abo id., nt 18l , l&H 8:3, 210. 
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use the term "academic" in a much narrower sense than 
does the Court. distinguishing "academic'' dismissals front 
ones based on "misconduct'' and holding that. when a student 
is dismissed for failing grades, a hearing \\·ould serve no 
purpose. ,s These cases may be viewed as consistent with 
our statement in llfothews v. Eldridge that "the probable 
value . . . of additional ... procedural safeguards" is a factor 
relevant to the due process inquiry. 424 U. S., at 335. quoted 
at p. 4. supra ; see 424 F S., at 343-347. But they provide I 
little assistance in resolving cases like the present one. where 
the dismissal i I not on failing rades but on conduct-
relate consi erations.19 
~ ismanic reliance on labels should not be 
a substitute for sensitive consideration of the procedures 
required by due process.20 When the facts disputed are of a. 
113 Sec Mahavongsanan v. Hall. 5:29 F. 2d 448, 450 (CA.5 1976) ; Gaspar 
v: Bruton. 513 F . 2d 8-!3. 8-!0-851 (C.,\10 19i,5) : .lfustell v. Ro1>e. 282 Ala .. 
358, 367, 211 So. 2d 489, 497- 498, cert. denied, 393 F. S. gag (1968); 
Barna.rd ,·. Inhabitants of Shelburne . 216 :\fa;,"· 19, 19-20, :22-23, 10:2 N. E . 
1095, 1096-1097 (1913) . 
10 See Brookins v. Bonnell. 3o2 F. Supp. 379, 3~3 (ED Pa. 1973): 
"This ca::;e is not, the traditional clisriplin:iry ~ituation where n ~tudent 
vi'ola.tes the lnw or a ;,ehool r<'gulation by neti,·el~· engaging in prohibited 
a.ctivitie;,. Pbintiff has allPg<'dfy failed to net and romp!_,. with "chool 
regulation,- for admis,;ion and rla,;,- attembnre b~· p~1""i ,·d~· ignoring these 
regulation,;: . Tlm-:e nlleged fai lurC':- do not con,-titute rni"conduct in the 
sense that plaintiff 1s subjPei to di,;riplinar~· procPdures. They do con-
stitute rni;:conclurt in the ,::('n;:e that plaintiff wa~ required to do something. 
Plaintiff rontrnd" that, he did comply " ·it h the r<'q111rements. Like t.he 
traditional di"ciplinar? ease. the determination of whet her plaintiff did 
or did not comp!~· with the "chool regulations is a qrn•,.;t ion of fact. Most. 
import:rntl~-. in determining thi,; foctu:11 que,,tion rderc•nre is not made to 
a stancl11rd of achb ·ernem in an e;;oterie arndemic field. Scholastic stand-
a rds are not, involved, buL rnrher d1;:puted fact" conc<'rning whether 
plaintiff did or did not comply with certain ~chool regulation,;. These 
J.ssues adapt t.liemsPh-es readily to determination by a fa ir and impartial 
1tli1e prore"s ' hea ring." 
20 The Comt's reliance on labels. moreover, may give those school 
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type susceptible to determination by third parties. as th(: 
·allegations about responcleilt ])lai,ily were. see ante, at 12-i3. 
11. 6, there is no more reason to deny ail procedural protection 
to one who will suffer a ser·ious·loss than there was in Goss v. 
Lopez, and indeed there may be good reason to provide evel'1 
more protection. as cliscussed in Part II. supra. A court's 
characterization of £he rc-asons ·ror a student's clisrnissal adds 
nothing to the effort to find procedures that are fair to the 
student and the school. and that promote the elusive goal of 
determining the truth in a manner consistent with both 
individual dignity ·ancl society's limited rf'sources. 
IV 
While T agree with the Court that respondent received 
adequate procedural due prncess. I camiot joiu the Court's 
judgment because it is based on resolution of an issue never 
reached by the Court of Appeals. ~Tha't court. taking a prop-
erly limited view of its role 'in constitu'tional cases. refused to 
offer dictum on respondent's substantive clue process claim 
when it ckcided the case on procedural due process grounds. 
See 538 F. 2d. at l:f21 n. '5. quoted anfo, at 13. ·Pe'ti'tioner 
therefore presented to us only questions relating to the pro-
cedural issue. Petition fot Certiorari. at ·2. bur normal 
course in such a case is to reverse on the ques'tions decided 
below and presentecl in llw pelition. and then 'to re)nand to 
the Court of Appeals for consicleration of any remaining issues. 
Rather than taking this course. the Court here decides on its 
own that the record wilJ not support a substantive due process 
claim. thereby "agree[ing]" with the District Court. Ante, 
at 13. I would allow the Court of Appeals to provide the first 
admini>'trntor,- who are reluctant to arrord dur prorr,.:,- to tlwir ,-fudents 
an exrm,'C' for not doini? :-o . Src !?Pll<'rall~· Kirp, Prorrdur:tli~m and 
Burenurrncy : Dur Proce,-s in the Srhool Srttinft. 28 St:1:i1. t .. -l{ev, 841 
(1976) , 
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level of appellate revif'w on this question. Not only would a 
remand give us the benefit of the low('r court's thoughts,21 it 
_would also allow u~ to mai n,tain consistency with our ow,; _ _ . +, 
Rule 23.1 (c). which states that "[olnly the questions set l.,..,l'Z,,()-7 · 
forth in the petition or fair°iy compriseci_ ti1ercin will be con- ~~~ 
siclered by the_ ~9urt.'' By byp::issing the courts of appeals 
on questions of this nature. _we do no servic;e to those courts 
that refuse to specu_l.ate in dictun~ on ~ wide range of issue~ 
and instead follow th'=: n19re prudentia\. preferred course of 
avoiding decision-particularly constitutional decision-until 
21 H would be u,;:eful, for rxample, to hnn' _more careful :l8Se:"Sment$ 
qf whethrr thr ,-chool followed it~ ow_n rule,- ind_im1i,-,-ing re::;pondent and 
9f whnt the lrgnl eon,-equ_f'II('(',- :<hoi1ld, be if 'it did not. The Court r-tates 
t;hat. jt-. "di:,;agrerf ,-;] with both re,.:pot)drnt\ foctnal :ind legal contentions." 
Ante, at. 13 n. 8. It thrn.·a,.:,-('J'1s that "the i:rcord rlearl_,· ,-how"" com-
pliance with t hr rule,-, ibid .. hut it _·pro,·idr,; ·ne_ither rlabora1 ion of this 
conclusion nor di,.:rur-sion of the ~pecifie ,ya~-,.. in which m;pondrnt contendR 
that the rule~ \\"N~ not followrd, Brirf for Tk,.:pondrnt, n t 42-46, conten-
iions accompanied b~· citations to th<:>· ;;an_w record that the Court find,- so 
"clear." Thr ;;tntrment of the Di;;trjrt Court cp1oted b~- tJ1e Court, ante, 
·at 14 11. 6. i:- not inron~i~trnt on it,: f:1rr with rr,_pondrnt ',- claim tlrn.t the 
rule;;; were not followed, nor i, t he_rr an~·i hing about t hr context of the 
statement to indicate thnt it w:1,- addre,-;;rd lo thi,, claim, see App. 45. 
Review b)· the Court of_ Appeal,: woul~! clarjf_,· thr"r factual issues, which 
rarely warrnnt the· expenditure 01 thi,.: Court'., time. lf the Court's vie"· 
of the record i,- cor.rrrt. howe,:rr, then 1 do not 11nder:,;tand wh)· the 
Court. goc,: on to comment 911. t hr lrgal consequence,- of a state of fact:--
i1rn.t the Court has .i11s1 }aid dor,: _not exisi. Like other a.~pects of the 
Court's opinion, di,-c·u,,ed su7Jra. the legal comment, on thi:,; issue are 
·nothin!( more than c9nfu;;ing dictum. It i,- true, a;; thr Court notes, ante, 
at 14 n. ~, that the decision from this Court rited b~· re~pondent was not 
_expressly grounded in the Dur Procp1-,- Clause. Servire v. Dulles. 354 U.S. 
363 (1957). But thnt fart, which amount, to the onl~- legal anal~·sis 
offered b~· thr Court on i hi,; que,-t ion, hard I)· an;,wer,- re,:pondent 's point 
that some compli:rnee with prr,·iou~I)· established rulr"-pariicularly rules 
providing procedural ,:afeguard:-:-ie< con,:titutionally required before the-
State or one of it.-, agenci'er-: may deprive a citi"m1 of a vaJru~1~e lilrrty or 
property int.cre,,t. 
. 
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"'absolutely necessary'" to resolutimi of a case. .1.~hwcwdcr 
v. TVA , supra , 297 U.S .. at 347 (Brandeis. J .. concurring). 
I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals anc\ 
remand for further proceedings. 
To : The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice St ewart 
Mr . Justice White 
Mr . Jus t ice Marshall 
Mr . Jus t i ce Pov,e l l 
Mr. Justice m:hnqui st 
Mr. Justice S~evens 
From : Mr . Justice Bl ackmun 
Circulated:_~------
l st PRINTED DRAFT Recircul:J.ted: 9/ 13 f 7 I r , 
BUPBEME ·COURT OF THE UNITED STATml ./ 
MR. JrsTI CE BLACKMLN. \\"ith "·hom MH. JcsTICE BRE.NNAX t 
joins, concurrin g in part a nd dissenting i11 part. I 
T he Court"s opin ion. a11d that of l\'lR . Jl·sncE MARSHALL, 
together demonstrate conclusively that. assuming the existence 
of a libf'rty or property i 11 te rest. responcle11 t received all the 
procedural process that was due her under tlw Fourteenth 
Amendment. T hat. for nw. disposes of this appeal. and com-
pels tlw reversal of the juclgme 11 t of the Court of Appeals. 
I find it unnecessary. thcrdore. to indulgc i11 the arguments 
and counterarguments contained in the two opinions as to 
the extent or type of procedural protection that th<' Four-
teenth Amendment requires in the graduate school-dismissal 
situation. Similarly. I also find it unnecessary to choose 
bet,vecn the arguments as to whether respondent's dismissal 
was for academic or disciplinary reasons ( or. indeed. \\'hether 
such a distinction is relevant). I do agree \\'ith MR. JFSTICE 
MARSHALL. howPver. that \\'e should leavr to the District 
Court and to the Court of Appeals in the first instance thr 
resolution of respondent's substa11 tive clue procrss claim and 
of any other claim presented to, but not dcciclcd by, those 
courts. 
Accordingly. l. too. would reverse the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings. 
• • 
February 16, 1978 
No. 76-695 Board of Curators v. Horowitz 
Dear Bill: ~ 
Here is a proposed concurring opinion that I ' am 
thinking about circulating as a response, primarily, to 
Thurgood's opinion. 
His view of the case is that respondent •was 
dismissed largely because of her conduct•, and not because 
of academic shortcomings. This is wholly at variance with, 
the facts as found by the District Court, but - absent a 
specific rebuttal - r.eaders of our opinions (especially 
critics of the Court) may well accept Thurgood's conclusion. 
I take it that up to now you have thought no 
response was necessary. I agree that a thoughtful reading 
of your opinion makes clear that the dismissal was 
academic. But it is not •head to head•, or as fully 
documented, as the type of response to Thurgood that I have 
drafted. 
If you wi.sh to incorporate the essence of my draft 
into your opinion,. I would be more than happy for you to do 
so. I would think, however, that it would require a good 
deal more revision than adding a footnote or two. What do 
you think? 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I join the Court's opinion because I read it as 
upholding the District Court's view that respondent was 
dismissed for academic deficiencies rather than for 
unsatisfactory personal c'onduct, and that in these 
circumstances she was accorded due process. 
In the numerous meetings and discussions 
respondent had with her teachers and advisers, see Opinion 
of Mr. Justice Marshall, post at 2-3, culminating in the 
special clinical examination administered by seven 
physicians, Opinion of the Court, ante at 3, respondent was 
warned of her clinical deficiencies and given every 
opportunity to demonstrate improvement or question the 
1 
evaluations. The primary focus of these discussions 
and examinations was on respondent's competency as a 
physician. 
Mr. Justice Marshall nevertheless states that 
respondent's dismissal was based "largely" on "her conduct": 
"It may nevertheless be true, as the Court 
implies, ante, at 12 n. 6, that the school decided 
that respondent's inadequacies in such areas as 
personal hygiene, peer and patient relations, and 
timeliness would impair her ability to be 'a good 
medical doctor.' Whether these inadequacies can 
be termed 'pure academic reasons,' as the Court 
calls them, ibid., is ultimately an irrelevant 
question, and one placing an undue emphasis on 
words rather than functional considerations. The 
relevant point is that respondent was dismisse~ 
largely because of her conduct, just as the 
students in Goss were suspended because of their 
conduct." Post, at 8 (emphasis added). 
2. 
This conclusion is explicitly contrary to the District 
Court's undisturbed findings of fact. In one sense, the 
term "conduct" could be used to embrace a poor academic 
performance as well as unsatistactory personal conduct. 
But I do not understand Mr. Justice Marshall to use the 
2 
term in that undifferentiated sense. His opinion 
likens the dismissal of respondent to the suspension of the 
students in Goss for personal misbehavior. There is 
evidence that respondent's personal conduct may have been 
viewed as eccentric, but - quite unlike the suspensions in 
Goss - respondent's dismissal was not based on her personal 
3 
behavior. 
The findings of the District Court conclusively 
show that respondent was dismissed for failure to meet the 
academic standards of the medical school. The court, after 
reviewing the evidence in some detail, concluded: 
"The evidence presented in this case totally 
failed to establish that plaintiff [respondent] 
was expelled for any reason other than the 
quality of her work." (App. 44) ii 
It is well to bear in mind that respondent was 
attending a medical school where competency in clinical 
courses is as much of a prerequisite to graduation as 
satisfactory grades in other courses. Respondent was 
dismissed because she was as deficient in her clinical work 
as she was proficient in the "book-learning" portion of the 
5 
curriculum. Evaluation of her performance in the 
3. 
former area is no less an "academic" judgment because it 
involves observation of her skills and techniques in actual 
conditions of practice, rather than assigning a grade to 
her written answers on an essay question. 
Because it is clear from the findings of fact by 
the District Court that respondent was dismissed solely on 
academic grounds, and because the standards of procedural 
due process were abundantly met before dismissal 
6 
occurred, I join the Court's opinion. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. As a safeguard against erroneous judgement, 
and at respondent's request (App. 36), the Medical School 
submitted the question of respondent's clinical competency 
to a panel of "seven experienced physicians". Panel members 
were requested "to provide a careful, detailed, and 
thorough assessment of [respondent's] abilities at this 
time." (App. 36). The Dean's letter to respondent of 
March 15, 1973, advised her quite specifically of the 
"general topic[s] in the curriculum about which we are 
asking [the panel] to evaluate your performance. II 
(App. 37). Each member of the examining panel was 
requested to "evaluate the extent of [respondent's] mastery 
of relevant concepts, knowledge, skills and competency to 
function as a physician." (App. 37). The examinations by 
members of the panel were conducted separately. Two of the 
doctors recommended that respondent be graduated (although 
one added that "she would not qualify to intern at the 
hospital where he worked"). (App. 40). Each of the other 
five doctors submitted negative recommendations, although 
they varied as to whether respondent should be dropped from 
school immediately. Ibid. 
N-2 
2. Indeed, in view of Mr. Justice Marshall's 
apparent conclusion that respondent was dismissed because 
of some objectively determinable conduct, it is difficult 
to understand his conclusion that the special examination 
administered by the seven practicing physicians "may have 
been better than[] a formal hearing." Post, at 6. That 
examination did not purport to determine whether, in the 
past, respondent had engaged in conduct that would warrant 
dismissal. Respondent apparently was not called upon to 
argue that she had not done certain things in the past. 
There were no facts found on that point. Nor did the 
doctors who administered the examination address themselves 
to respondent's conduct at the time, apart from her ability 
to perform the clinical tasks physicians must master. Mr. 
Justice Marshall says that this evaluation tested the 
"truth" of the assertions that respondent could not 
function as a doctor. Post at 7, n. 14. This is a tacit 
recognition that the issue was an academic one, rather than 
one limited to whether respondent simply engaged in 
improper conduct. 
3. There was concern on the part of the faculty 
as to respondent's personal hygiene, but the District Court 
made clear that this was not the cause for her dismissal: 
N-3 
With regard to plaintiff's physical appearance, 
this in and of itself did not cause plaintiff to 
be evaluated any differently than any of the other 
students; however, plaintiff's unkempt appearance 
and condition were much cause for concern with 
both faculty and students, and this was brought to 
her attention on numerous occasions; but she was 
not treated in any manner than any other student 
with similar deficiencies would have been 
treated." (App. 45). 
4. The District Court also found: 
"Considering all of the evidence presented, 
the Court finds that the grading and evaluating 
system of the medical school was applied fairly 
and reasonably to plaintiff, but plaintiff did not 
satisfy the requirements of the medical school to 
graduate from the medical school in June 1973." 
(App. 45) 
5. Dr. William Sirridge was the faculty member 
assigned to respondent as her "chief docent" (faculty 
adviser). A portion of his testimony was summarized by the 
District Court As follows: 
"He [Dr. Sirridge] emphasized that plaintiff's 
[respondent's] problem was that she thought she 
could learn to be a medical doctor by reading 
books, and he advised her [that] the clinical 
skills were equally as important for obtaining the 
M.D. degree. He further testified that plaintiff 
cannot perform many of the necessary basic skills 
required of a practicing physician; ..•. " (App. 
35) • 
6. I agree with the Court that university 
faculties must have the widest range of discretion in 
making judgments as to the academic performance of students 
and their entitlement to promotion or graduation. In terms 
of the process that "is due", there is a significant 
distinction between a dismissal for academic reasons and 
dismissal for improper conduct. 
lfp/ss 2/16/78 
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students in Goss for personal misbehavior. There is 
evidence that respondent's personal conduct may have been 
viewed as eccentric, but - quite unlike the suspensions in 
Goss - respondent's dismissal was not based on her personal 
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The findings of the District Court conclusively 
show that respondent was dismissed for failure to meet the 
academic standards of the medical school. The court, after 
reviewing the evidence in some detail, concluded: 
"The evidence presented in this case totally 
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was expelled for any reason other than the 
quality of her work." (App. 44) _!/ 
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attending a medical school where competency in clinical 
courses is as much of a prerequisite to graduation as 
satisfactory grades in other courses. Respondent was 
dismissed because she was as deficient in her clinical work 
as she was proficient in the "book-learning" portion of the 
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curriculum. Evaluation of her performance in the 
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former area is no less an "academic" judgment because it 
involves observation of her skills and techniques in actual 
conditions of practice, rather than assigning a grade to 
her written answers on an essay question. 
Because it is clear from the findings of fact by 
the District Court that respondent was dismissed solely on 
academic grounds, and because the standards of procedural 
due process were abundantly met before dismissal 
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occurred, I join the Court's opinion. 
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1. As a safeguard against erroneous judgement, 
and at respondent's request (App. 36), the Medical School 
submitted the question of respondent's clinical competency 
to a panel of "seven experienced physicians". Panel members 
were requested "to provide a careful, detailed, and 
thorough assessment of [respondent's] abilities at this 
time." (App. 36). The Dean's letter to respondent of 
March 15, 1973, advised her quite specifically of the 
"general topic[s] in the curriculum about which we are 
asking [the panel] to evaluate your performance. " 
(App. 37). Each member of the examining panel was 
requested to "evaluate the extent of [respondent's] mastery 
of relevant concepts, knowledge, skills and competency to 
function as a physician." (App. 37). The examinations by 
members of the panel were conducted separately. Two of the 
doctors recommended that respondent be graduated (although 
one added that "she would not qualify to intern at the 
hospital where he worked"). (App. 40). Each of the other 
five doctors submitted negative recommendations, although 
they varied as to whether respondent should be dropped from 
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2. Indeed, in view of Mr. Justice Marshall's 
apparent conclusion that respondent was dismissed because 
of some objectively determinable conduct, it is difficult 
to understand his conclusion that the special examination 
administered by the seven practicing physicians "may have 
been better than[] a formal hearing." Post, at 6. That 
examination did not purport to determine whether, in the 
past, respondent had engaged in conduct that would warrant 
dismissal. Respondent apparently was not called upon to 
argue that she had not done certain things in the past. 
There were no facts found on that point. Nor did the 
doctors who administered the examination address themselves 
to respondent's conduct at the time, apart from her ability 
to perform the clinical tasks physicians must master. Mr. 
Justice Marshall says that this evaluation tested the 
"truth" of the assertions that respondent could not 
function as a doctor. Post at 7, n. 14. This is a tacit 
recognition that the issue was an academic one, rather than 
one limited to whether respondent simply engaged in 
improper conduct. 
3. There was concern on the part of the faculty 
as to respondent's personal hygiene, but the District Court 
made clear that this was not the cause for her dismissal: 
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With regard to plaintiff's physical appearance, 
this in and of itself did not cause plaintiff to 
be evaluated any differently than any of the other 
students; however, plaintiff's unkempt appearance 
and condition were much cause for concern with 
both faculty and students, and this was brought to 
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not treated in any manner than any other student 
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MEMORANDUM FOR :MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: Bob DATE: 2/17/78 
RE: Justice Rehnquist's Response to Your Horowitz Draft 
Sally showed me Justice Rehnquist's letter, which came 
into Chambers shortly after you left for Conference. I can 
hardly express the shock it gave me. (Judge Hunter used to 
invoke a "desk drawer, one day" rule: put the letter you have 
jut: written in indignation in your desk for a day and wait to 
cool off. Unfortunately, it's hard to wait for a day around 
here.) I had always thought that the genius of the common law 
was that it announced principles through the vehicle of cases 
- which turned on their individual facts, permitting like cases 
-
to be treatHl alike and different ones differently. Now we are 
scolded by Justice Rehnquist that this is no longer the case. 
This Court is to conceal the facts intentionally, to announce the 
broadest principle possible so that other cases cannot be distinguished. 
I must say that I suspected that this is what WHR was up to, but 
I find it incredible that he would admit such a motive candidly 
and on paper. 
There were nine votes to reverse precisely because of the 
facts of this case, not some broad princ:ple which must stand 
unaltered for all time. Indeed, the case was taken on plenary 
review only _ because the Court felt that on the strong facts 






proposed per curiam last Term, the property question. Now we 
are told that the facts don't count after all. 
author of 
Having been told that the/Court opinion hopes it will 
be read precisely as we feared, I think it is incumbent upon 
you to do what WHR hopes you will not do: put a gloss on _the 
Court opinion. He has declared that in his view, a Goss-type 
give-and-take is more than due process requires even when the 
interest at stake is permanent dismissal from the school; that 
is what he hopes the opinion will be read to say. Whether or 
not one believes that is correct (I do not, and you have indicated 
that you do not, either), on the facts of this case there simffely 
is no reason to say it. I do not see why WHR should be permitted 
to reshape reality to suit the princ:ip..e he wishes to announce. 
Your concurrence in Branzburg had a similar restraining effect; 
indeed, it is read as the opinion for the Court in that case. 
In light of WHR's professed belief that the opinion will 
be read as holding that even a bare minimum Goss-type hearing 
is not required in these circumstances, I suggest adding the 
following footnote to your concurrence at the end of the first 
paragraph: 
I do not join the opinion of the Court insofar 
as it implies that students permanently dismissed 
for academic reasons are not entitled to an 
"informal give-and-take" such as that required in 
Goss v. Lo1ez, 419 U.S. 656 (1975). Permanent dismissalrom an institution of higher learning 
is a far more serious loss than that inflicted 
through the 10-day suspension from a public high 
school imposed in Goss. It is unnecessary in this 





case, however, to specify the minimum procedurual 
protections that must accompany an academic dismissal, 
As the opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall makes clear, 
~ at 2-3, respondent received received far more 
truin the minimum. 
This will not put ~ '.'gloss" on the opinion; instead, it will 
indicate the proper ratio decidendi of the case. Your opinion 
will have to serve as the opinion of the Court, since WHR 
is unwilling to write one. As the fifth vote, I think you 
must do something along these lines. 
.. ,-. .. - -;§u.prtmt C!foltrl llf f!rt ,mtth ;§taus 
-aslrfnghttt, ~. C!f. 2llp~$ ... 
CHAMBERS OF /) • j ~ ~~ ~ '-
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST f)'f./~i,Y . f 1 ~ 
, A i,,l pl>l); '1-~ ,/ }'!17· 
(ft,.' 
j ~v:~ ~ ~ -r ~~ e,I February 17, 1978 
Re: No. 76-695 Board of curators v. Horowitz 
Dear Lewis: 
Thank you f or your letter of February 16, attachi ng a 
proposed concurri ng op i n i on i n the above case. I disagree with 
nothing contained in your concurrence, but as you say the full 
thrust of what you want to say could not be picked up by simply 
adding two or three footnotes to my present court opinion. 
This leaves me with the choice of substantially altering 
•the structure of my present opinion, or having you join it as 
is but file the concurre nce attached in your letter of February 16. 
For several reasons, I think I prefer the latter course. We have 
a five man majority, which I always regard as somewhat fragile, 
and one is never sure when substantial changes are made in such 
a court opinion whether there might be a temptation on the part 
of some other member of the majority either to bolt or to suggest 
addition s or changes of his own. In addition, by dealing less 
with Thurgood's detailed factual assertions than your concurrence 
does, I think we have in the Court opinion a good vehicle for 
putting some perspective on Goss v. Lopez, in which I joined your 
dissent, indicating that the necessity of a hearing is directed 
to the situation where there is a dispute about a factual occurrence. 
1 
The more the Court opinion responds to Thurgood's factual 
controversies, the more easy it becomes to distinguish in future 
cases, and the more easy it is for judges who might want to read 
it narrowly to limit the concept of "academic dismissal" as opposed 
to dismissal for conduct. I realize there is nothing in your 
concurrence that would expressly support such a limitation, but 
with one hundred odd new federal judges about to be appointed, 
• ' t ,_ __ - -
~~' 
" Ir ,tft 
- 2 -
several dozen of them at the Court of Appeals level, I think we 
can be sure that they will be arguing in their conferences about 
the meaning of our cases just as we do. To the extent that the 
court opinion gives the impression that minor factual variations 
are relevant to its basic point, I think it is a stronger opinion 
and less easy to distinguish for that reason. 
Because of this consideration, the only suggestion I would 
urge upon you in connection with the concurrence is that you omit 
the language from the first sentence "because I read it as upholding 
the District court's view that respondent was dismissed for 
academic deficiencies". The Court opinion presently says that 
in so many words see e.g., page 11: "Under such circumstances, 
we decline to ignore the historic judgment of educators and thereby 
formalize the academic dismissal process by requiring a hearing." 
When a concurring opinion opens with the language "because I read 
t/.J, it as • • • " it necessarily gives the intimation that there is 
some language in the court's opinion or perhaps some part of its 
holding that the author of the sepa r a te concurrence does not agree 
with. I would rather try to meet any objections that you may have 
to my opinion squarely on those grounds, if they exist. But, as 
I say, reading your concurrence, I do not disagree with any part 
of it, and therefore I suspect you do not disagree with my opinion 
for the court. If I am right in these assumptions, I think it 
would help the view of the Constitution which we both believe to 
be correct if you would simply break the first sentence of your 
draft concurrence into two sentences, with the first one reading 
"I join the court's opinion.", and the second one beginning 
"Respondent was dismissed for academic deficiencies rather than 
for unsatisfactory personal conduct, etc." This would certainly 
preserve all your meaning, and yet a v oid the implication that you 
feel it necessary to put your own gloss upon the court's opinion. 
If I am wrong in this conclusion, and you do wish to put your own 
gloss on my opinion, obviously this suggestion will be less than 
satisfactory to you. 
Should you wish to talk about this any more, I will be 
available at any time and place. 
Sincerely~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
- · vuo~~ue "rennan 
Mr. J~ i~ wart Mr. J st1 1te 
Mr. J 1 lackmun 
~r. Justice Powell 
~ Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Mr. Justice Stevena 
From~ Mr. Justice Marshall 
Circulated: ______ _ 
4th DRAFT Recirculated: 2 3 tEB 1971 
SUPRE~E COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 76-695 
Board of Curators of the Univer-




On Writ of Certiorari to 
the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth 
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[February -, 1978] 
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
I agree with the Court that, "[a]ssuming the ~xistence of a 
liberty or property interest, respondent has been awarded at 
least as much due p~ocess as the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires." Ante, at 6. I cannot join the Court's opinion, 
however, because it contains dictum suggesting that respondent 
was entitled to even less procedural protection than she 
received. I also differ from the Court in its assumption that 
character~zation of the reasons for a dismissal as "academic" 
or "disciplinary" is relevant to resolution of the question of 
what procequres are required by the D'1e Process Clause. 
Finally, I disagree with the Court's decision not to remand to 
the Court of Appeals for consideration of respondent's sub-
stantive due process claim. 
I 
We held in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975), that 
"due process requires, in connection with a suspension of 
10 days or less, that the student be given oral or written 
notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, 
an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and 
an opportunity to present his side of the story." Id., at 
581. 
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There is no question that respondent received these protec• 
tions, and more.1 
According to the stipulation of facts filed in the District 
Court, respondent had a "discussion" with the dean of the 
medical school in mid-1972, at the close of her first year in 
"School, during which she was notified of her unsatisfactory 
performance.2 The dean testified that he explained the 
11ature of her problems to respondent twice at this meeting, 
so that she would fully understand them. 3 A letter from the 
dean followed shortly thereafter, in which respondent was 
advised that she was being placed on probation beGause of, 
inter aJi,a,, "a major deficiency" in her "relationships with 
others," and her failure to "keep . . . to established schedules" 
and "attend . . . carefully to personal appearance." 4 The 
dean again met with respondent in October 1972 "to call atten-
tion in a direct and supportive wfy to the fact that her per-
formance was not then strong." 5 
In January 1973, there was still another meeting between 
respondent and the dean. who w~s accompanied by respond-
ent's docent and the chairman of the Council on Evaluation. 
Respondent was there notified of the Council's recommenda-
tion that she not graduate and that she be dropped from 
school unless there was "r~dical improvement" in her "clinical 
cpmpetence. peer and patient relations, personal hygiene, and 
ability to accept criticism." 6 A letter ·from the dean aga.in 
1 It is necessary to recount the fact s underlying this conclusion in some 
' detail, because the Court's opinion does not provide the relevant facts with 
regard to the notice and opportunity to reply given to respondent. 
2 App. 15. It is likely that respondent was les.s formally notified of these 
· deficiencies several months earlier, in March 1972. See id., at 10()...clOl 
(testimony of respondent's docent) . 
3 Id., at 146. 
4 Id. , at 15-16. 
i5 Id., at 147. 
t Id.., at 18. 
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followed the meeting; the letter summarized respondent's 
problem areas and noted that they had been discussed with 
her "several times." 7 
These meetings and letters plainly gave respondent all that 
Goss requires: several notices and explanations, and at least 
three opportunities "to present [her] side of the story." 419 
U. S., at 581. I do not read the Court's opinion to disagree 
with this conclusion. Hence I do not understand why the 
Court indicates that even the "informal give-and-take" man-
dated by Goss, id., at 584, need not have been provided here. 
See ante, at 7-8, 11-12. This case simply provides no legiti-
mate opportunity to consider whether "far less stringent pro-
cedural requirements," id., _at 7-8, than those required in Goss 
are appropriate in other school contexts. While I disagree 
with the Court's conclusion that "far less" is adequate, as 
discussed infra, it is equally disturbing that the Court decides 
an issue not presented by the case before us. As Mr. Justice 
Brandeis warned over 40 years ago. the " 'great gravity and 
delicacy' " of our task in constitutional cases should cause us 
to " 'shrink' " from "'anticipat[ing] a question of constitu-
tional law in a.dvance of the necessity of deciding it.' " and 
I 
from "'formulat[ing] a rule of constitutional law broader 
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be 
applif:ld.'" Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 345-347 (1936) 
( concurring opinion) . 
II 
In view of the Court's dictum to the effect that even the 
minimum procedures required in Goss need not have been 
-provided ·to respondent, I feel compelled to comment on the 
extent of procedural protection mandated here. I do so 
within a framework largely ignored by the Court, a frame-
work derived from our traditional approach to these problems. 
According to our prior decisions, as summarized in Mat hews -v4 
1 Id., ·at 182-183. 
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Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976), three factors are of principal 
relevance in determining what process is due: 
"First, the private interest that will be affected by the 
official action; seconq, the risk of an erroneous depriva-
tion of such interest through the procedures used, and 
the probable value, if any. of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's 
interest. i)1cluding the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the additional or sub-
stitute procedural requirement would entail." Id., at 
335. 
As the Court recognizes. the "private interest" involved 
here is a weighty one: "the deprivation to which respondent 
was subjected-dismissal from a graduate medical school-
was more severe than the IO-day suspension to which the high 
school students were subjected in Goss." Ante, at 8 n. 3. 
One example of the loss suffered by respondent is contained in 
. the stipulation of facts: respondent had a job offer from the 
psychiatry department of another university to begin work in 
September 1973; the offer was contingent on her receiving the 
M. D. degree.8 In summary. as tpe Court of Appeals noted: 
"The unrefuted evidence here establishes that Horowitz 
has been stigmatized by her dismissal in such a way 
that she will be unable to continue her medical education, 
and her chances of returning to employment in a medi-
cally related field are severely damaged." 538 F. 2d 
1317. 1321 (CA8 1976). 
As Judge Friendly has written in a related context, when the 
State seeks "to deprive a person of a way of life to which 
[s]he has devoted years of preparation and on which [s]he ... 
ha[s] come to rely," it should be required first to provide a 
"high level of procedural protection." 9 
8 Id., at 16. 
9 Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 143 U. Pa . L. Rev. 1267, 1296-1297 
1(1975) ( revocation of professional licenses) . 
76-695-CONCUil & DlSSENT 
BOARD OF CURATORS, U~IV. OF MO. v. HOROWITZ 5 
Neither of the other two factors mentioned in Mathews 
justifies moving from a high level to the lower level of 
protection involved in Goss. There was at least some risk 
of error inherent in the evidence on which the dean relied in 
his meetings with and letters to re~pondent; faculty evalua-
tions of such matters as personal hygiene and patient and 
peer rapport are neither as "sharply focused" nor as "easily 
documented" as was, e. g., the disability determination 
involved in Mathews, 424 U. S., at 343. See Goss v. Lopez! 
supra, 419 U. S., at 580 (when decisionma.ker "acti[s] on the 
reports and advice of others ... [ t] he risk of error is not at 
all trivial").10 
Nor can it be said that the university had any greater 
interest in summary proceedings here than did the school in 
G.oss. Certainly the allegedly disruptive and disobedient 
students involved there. see id., at 569-571 , posed more of 
an immedill,te threat to orderly school administration than did 
respondent. As we noted in Goss, moreover, "it disserves . .. 
the interest of the State if •[the student's] suspension is in fact 
unwarranted." Id., at 579.1 1 Under these circumstances-
with respondent having much mare at stake than did the 
students in Goss, the administration at best having no more at 
stake, and the meetings betweeh respondent and the dean 
leaving some possibility of erroneous dismissal-I believe that 
respondent was entitled to more procedural protection than is 
provided by "informal give-and-take" before the school could 
dismiss her. 
The contours of the additional procedural protection to 
which respondent was entitled ~1eed not be defined in terms 
10 The inquiry about. risk of error cannot be separated from the first 
inquiry about the private interest at stake. The more serious the conse-
quences for the individual, the smaller the risk of error that, will be 
acceptable. 
11 The statements and letters of the medical school dean reflect a 
genuine concern that respondent not be wrongfully dismissed. See App_. 
147-150, 180-183, 185-187. 
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of the traditional adversarial system so familiar to lawyers 
and judges. See Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U. S., at 
348. We ha.ve emphasized many times that " [ t] he very 
nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible pro-
-cedures universally applicable to every imaginaple situation." 
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); see, 
e. g., ante, at 7; Goss v. Lopez, supra, 419 U. S. , at 578. In 
other words, wha.t process is due will vary "according to spe-
cific factual contexts." Hannah v. Larche, 363 U. S. 420, 442 
(1960); see, e. g., Ma.thews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U. S., at 
334; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 411. 481 (1972); Bell v. 
Burson, 402 U. 5. 535, 540 (1971). See also Joint Anti-Fascist 
Refugee Conimittee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 162-163 
(1951) (Frankfurter. J .. cpncurring). 
In the instant factual context the "appeal" provided to 
respondent. see ante, at 3. served the same purposes as, and 
in some respects may have been better than. a formal hearing. 
In establishing the procedure under which respondent was 
evaluated separately by seven physicians who had had little 
or no previous contact with -her, it appea.rs that the medical 
school placed emJjhasis 011 obtaining "a ·fair and neutral and 
impartial assessment." 1 ~ 1n order to evaluate respondent, 
each of the seven physicians spent approximately one half-
day observing her as she performed various clinical duties and 
then submitted a report on her performance to the dean.13 
It is difficult to imagine a better procedure for determining 
whether the school's -allegations against respondent had any 
substance to them.14 Cf. ·Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 
12 ld., at 150 (testimony of dean) ; see id., at 185, 187, 208, 210 (letters 
to respondent and seven physicians) . 
13 See id., at 190--207. 
14 Respondent appears to argue that, her sex and her religion were under~ 
lying reasons for her di~mi~sal and that a hearing would have helped t@ 
resolve the "factual dispute" between her and the school on these issues. 
Brief for Respondent, at 30; see id .. at 51-52. See also ante, at 13 n. 7. 
But the only ex1>ress grounds for ;res,pondent's dismissal relat!l.d to defiden.-
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U. S., at 337-338, 344 ( use of independent physician to exam-
ine disability applicant and report to decision maker). I 
therefore believe that the appeal procedure utilized by 
respondent, togethe~ with her earlier notices from and meet-
ings with the dean, provided r~spondent with as much pro-
cedural protection as the Due Process Clause requires.15 
III 
The analysis in Parts I and II of this opinion illustrates 
that resolution of this case under our traditional approach 
does not turn on whether the dismissal of respondent is char-
acterized as one for "aca.demic" or "disciplina.ry" ' reasons. In 
my view, the effort to apply such labels does little to advance 
the due process inquiry. as is indicated by examination of the 
facts of this case. 
The minutes of the meeting at which it was first decided 
th~t respondent should not graduate contain the following: 
"This issue is not one of academic achievement, but of 
performance, relationship to people and ability to com-
municate." App. 218 (emphasis addeq) . 
By the customary measures of acadelnic progress, moreover, 
no deficiency was apparent at the time tht\,t the authorities 
decided respondent could not graduate; prior to this time, 
cies in personal hygiene, patient rapport, and the like, and , as a matter 
of procedural due process, respondent was entitled to no more than a 
forum to contest the factual underpinni11gs of these grounds. The 11-ppeal 
procedure here gave respondent such a forum-an opportunity to demon-
stra,te that the school's charges were "unfair or mi&-taken," Gass v. •Lopez, I 
419 U.S. 565,581 (1975) . 
15 Like a hearing, the appeal procedure and the meetings 
~'represent.[ed] .. . a valued human interaction in which the affected 
person experience[d] n.t lea.&t the satisfaction of participating in the decision 
that vitally concern [ ed] her . . . . [T] hese rights t~ interchange express 
the elementary idea that to be a person, rather than a thing, is at least to 
be consulted about what is done with one." L. Tribe, American Constitu-
tional Law § 10-7, at 503 (1977) (emphasis in original) . 
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according to the stipulation of facts, respondent had received 
"credit" and "satisfactory grades" in all of her courses, includ-
ing clinical courses.1.6 
It may nevertheless b!c) true. as the Court implies, ante, at 
12 n. 6, that the school decided that respondent's inadequacies· 
in such areas as personal hygiene, peer and patient relations, 
and timeliness would impair her ability to be "a good medical 
doctor." Whether these inadequacies can be termed "pure 
academic reasons." as the Court calls them, ibid., is ultimately 
an irrelevant question. and one placing an undue emphasis on 
words rather than functional considerations. The relevant 
point is that respondent was dismissed largely because of her 
concluct.11 just as the students in Goss were suspended because 
of their conduct.18 
1s App. 12. Respondent later received "no credit" for her emergency 
room rot.a.t.ion. the on]~, cour:se in which her grade was fess than satis-
factory . Ibid. This grnde wa,; not recorded, according to the District 
Court, until nfter the decision had been made that. respondent could not 
graduate. !cl .. at 31. When tl1e Coordinating Committee made this deci-
sion, rporeover, it. apparently 1rnd not. seen any evaluation of respondent's 
emergenc~, room performm1ce. See icT., at '229 (minutes of Coordinating 
Committee meeting). 
17 Only one of the Teasons voiced by the school for deciding not to 
graduate respondent had a.ny arguable nonconduct aspects, and that rea-
son, "clinical competence," was plainly related to perceived deficiencies in 
respondent's personal hygiene and relationships wit11 colleagues and 
patients. See ii!., at 219. See n1so ia., at 181, 182-183, 210. 
~ 8 The f11tilit~- of trying to draw a workable distinction between "aca-
demic" ancl "di,:ciplinary" dismissals is further illust rated by my Brother 
PowELL';; conrurring opinion. The opinion states tha.t the conclusion in 
te:\i supra. ·' i;i explicitly cont.rary to the Di8trict Court's undist urbed :find-
ings of fact." ante, at 2. but it rites no District Court finding inclicating 
that re~ponclent's cli&missal was based on other than conduct-rela.ted con-
siderations. No &·uch :finding exists. 
Thr District. Court's ;;tat~ment that respondent was dismissed because 
of '·the qualit.v of her work," quoted id., at 3, like statements to the 
effort that the dismis::-al was "solely on academic grounds," id., a,t, 4, is 
,tcltimately irrelevant to the due proce~s· inqrniry. It provides no inforll.\il.~ 
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The Court makes much of decisions from state and lower 
federal courts to support its point that "dismissals for 
academic . .. cause do not necessitate a hearing." Ante, at 
9. The decisions on which the Court relies, however, plainly 
use the term "academic" in a much narrower sense than 
does the Court, distinguishing "academic" dismissals from 
ones based on "misconquct" and holding that, when a student 
is dismissed for failing grades, a hearing would serve no 
purpose.10 These cases may be viewed as consistent with 
tion on the critical question whether "the facts disputed are of a. type 
susceptible to determination by third parties." Infra, at IO. Nor does 
the District Court's finding that "the grading a11d evaluating system of 
the medical school was applied fair!~·," quoted ante, at 3 n. 4, advance 
resolution of this case, especially in view of the fa.ct, noted supra, that 
respondent's grades in clinical courses. as in all other course, were satis-
factory when the decision was made that she could not. graduate. This 
fact further indicates, contrar)' to MR. JUSTICE PowELL's intimation, 
ahte, at 3-4, that the school found the deficiencies in respondent 's clinicaI 
perform1111ce to be different from the deficiencies t.hat lead to unsatisfac-
tory grades in more traditional scholastic subjects. 
Mn·. JUSTICE PowELL is· correct, of course, in suggesti'ng that the kind 
of conduct here involved is different from that involved in Goss v. Lopez, 
supra. A'nte, at 2,-3, and n. 2. The question facing the medical school 
authoritif's was not solely wbetper respondent ha.d misbehaved in the past, 
but rather whether her pa~t , present, and likely future conduct indicated 
.that she would not, be "a good medical doctor," ante, at 12 n. 6 (opinion of 
the Court). The ll,])peal procedure of the school was well suited to aid 
in re-olution of this question, since it involved "observation of her :;kills 
and techniques in actual conditions of practice," ante, at, 4 (POWELL, J., 
concurring). It matters not at all whether the result, of such obs~rvation 
i's label'ed "an 'academic' judgment," ibid., so long as it i,,; recognized that 
the ;;;chool authorities, having an efficient procedure available to deter-
mine whet.her their decision to dismiss respondent wa,- '· unfair or mi::;~ 
t.aken,"· Goss v. Lopez . supra, 419 U. S., at, 581, were constitutionally 
required io give respondent a ~hance to invoke the procedure, as they 
did, before depriving her of a substantial liberty or property interest. 
19 s~ Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F. 2d 448, 450 (CA5 1976) ; Gaspar 
v. Bruton, 513' F. 2d 843, 849-851 (CAlO 1975); Mustell v. Rose, 282 Ala. 
·3,5g.i 367, 211 So. 2d 489, 497-498, cert. denied., 39'3 U .. S. 9.89 (!968:).,; 
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our statcme11t in .Matheivs v. Eldridge that "the probable 
value . . . of additional ... procedura1 safeguards" is a factor 
relevant to the due process inquiry. 424 U. S. , at 335, quoted 
at p. 4. supra; see 424 U. S .. at 343-347. But they provide 
1ittle assistance in resolving cases like the present one, where 
the dismissal is based 11ot on · failing grades but on conduct-
related considerations. 20 
In such cases a talismanic reliance on labels should not be 
a substitute for se11sitive consideration of the procedures 
required by. due process.21 '''hen the facts disputed are of a 
type susceptible to determination by thirq parties, as the 
allegations about respondent plainly were. see ante, at 12-13, 
n. 6, there is no more reason to deny all procedural protection 
to one who will suffer a serious loss than there was in Goss v. 
Banwrd "· Inhabitants of Shelburne, 216 Mass. 19, 19-20, 22-23, 102 N. E. 
1095, 1096-1097 (1913). 
20 Sec Brookius \. Bon11el/. :rn2 F. Supp. 379, 38'.3 (ED Pa. 1973): 
"This case is not. the traditional di,;ciplinar~· ;;ituation where a student 
violates the law or a school regulation by active!)· engaging in prohibited 
activities. Plaintiff has :1.!leg<'dl~· fajled to act :mcl comply with school 
regulations for admis:-<itm and cla.~s nttendancc b~· pas:;ively ignoring these 
regulations. The,;e illlegt•d fa llures do not. constitute misconduct in the 
sense that plaintiff is ,;ubjec-t to disciplinar>' procedures. They do con-
stitute misconduct. in tl1e :;ense that plaintiff was required to do something. 
Plaintiff contends that lw dlu comp!>· witl1 tl1e 1,eqnirements. Like the 
traditional di:;ciplinar>· case. flie determination of w11ether plaintiff did 
or did not, comply with the 8cl10ol rcgub tions is a. que,;tion of fact. Most 
importantly, in determining thi,; factual que,;tion reference is not. ma.de to 
a standard of achif'vement. in an esol'erir acndenuc field. Scholastic stand-
ards are not involved, but, rather disputed fort;; concerning whether 
plaintiff did or did not comply with certain school regulations. These 
issues adapt Uiem,;elves readily to determina,tion by a fair and impa.rtiaJ 
· 'due process' hearing." 
21 The Court':; reliance on labels, moreover, may give those school 
administrators who a.re reluct,mt to accord due proces8 to their students 
an excuse for not doing :;o. See generally IGrp, Proceduralism and 
Bureaucracy: Due J>rocess in the School Setting, ·28 St~n . L .. Rev. 841 
(1976). 
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Lopez, and indeed there may be good reason to provide even 
more protection, as discussed in Part II. supra. A court's 
characterization of the reasons for a student's dismissal adds 
nothing to the effort to find procedures that are fair to the 
student and the school, and that promote the elusive goal of 
determining the truth in a manner consistent with both 
individual dignity and society's limited resources. 
IV 
While I agree with the Court that respondent received 
adequate procedural due process. I cannot join the Court's 
judgmeHt because it is based on resolution of an issue never 
reached by the Court of Appea.ls. That court. taking a prop-
erly limited view of its role in constitutional cases, refused to 
offer dictum on respondept's substantive due process claim 
when it decided the case on procedural due process grounds. 
See 538 F. 2d, at 1321 n. 5. quoted ante, at 13. Petitioner 
therefore presented to us only questions relating to the pro-
cedural issue. Petition for Certiorari, at 2. Our normal 
course in such a case is to reverse on the questions decided 
below and presented in the petition , and then to remand to 
the Court of Appeals for consideration of any remaining issues. 
Rather than taking this course, the Court here decides on its 
own that the record will not support a substantive due process 
claim, thereby "agree [ing]" with the District Court. Ante, 
at 13. T would allow the Court of Appeals to provide the first 
level of appellate review on this question. Not only would a 
remand give us the benefit of the lower court's thoughts, 2 i it 
22 It would be useful, for exnmple, to lrnve more CR,reful assessments 
of whet.her the school followed its own rules in dismissing respondent and 
of what the Iegnl consequence;; should be if it did not. The Court states 
that it ·'disagree[s] with both respondent 's factual nnd legal contentions.'' 
Ante, a.t 13 n . 8. It. then asserts that "the record clearly shows" com-
pliance with the rules, ibid .. but it provides neither elnboration of this 
eonclusion nor discussion of the specific ways in which respondent contends 
that tne rules were not followed, Brief for Respondent, at 42-46, conten,. 
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would also allow us to maintain consistency with our own 
Rule 23.1 (c), which states that "[o]nly the questions set 
forth in the petition or fairly comprised therein will be con-
sidered by the court." By bypassing the courts of appeals 
on questions of this nature, we do no service to those courts 
that refuse to speculate in dictum on a wide range of issues 
and instead follow the more prudential. preferred course of 
avoiding decision~particularly constitutional decision-until 
"'absolutely necessary'" to resolution of a case. Ashwander 
v. TVA, supra, 297 U. S., at 347 (Brandeis, J. , concurring). 
I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
remand for further proceedings. 
tions accompanied by citations to the same record that the Court finds so 
"clear." The statement of the District Court quoted by the Court, ante, 
at 14 n. 6, is not inconsistent on its face with respondent 's claim that the 
rules were not followed, nor is there anything about the context of the 
statement to indicate that it was addressed to this claim, see App. 45. 
Review by the Court of Appeals would clarify these factual issues, which 
rarely warra.nt the expenditure of this Court's time. If the Court's view 
of the record is correct , however. then I do not understand why the 
Court goes on to comment on the legal consequences of a state of facts 
that the Court has just said does not exist. Like other aspects of the 
Court's opinion, di8cussed supra. the legal comments on this issue a.re 
nothing more than confusing dictum. It is true, as the Court notes, ante, 
a.t 14 n. 8, that the decision from this Court. cited by respondent was not 
expressly grounded in the Due Process Clause. Service v. Dulles. 354 U.S. 
363 (1957) . But that fact, which amounts to the only legal ana.Jysis 
offered by the Court on this question, hardly answers respondent's point 
that some compliance with previou8ly e~tablished rules-particularly rules 
providing procedural safeguards-is constitutionally required before the 
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New footnote 5, end of runover paragraph, p.4: 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL insists that calling this an 
academic judgment is an exercise in futility. Post, at 8 
n.18. As the Court points out, however, the distinction 
between dismissals for academic deficiency and dismissal 
for misconduct may be decisive as to the process that is 
due. Ante, at 11. A decision relating to the misconduct 
of a student requires a factual determination whether the 
conduct took place or not. The accuracy of that 
determination can be safeguarded by the sorts of 
procedural protections traditionally imposed under the Due 
Process Clause. An academic judgment also involves this 
type of objectively determinable fact -- e.g., whether the 
student gave certain answers on an examination. But the 
critical decision requires a subjective, expert evaluation 
as to whether that performance satisfies some 
predetermined standard of academic competence. That 
standard, in turn, is set by a similarly expert judgment. 
These evaluations, which go far beyond questions of mere 
"conduct," are not susceptible to the same sorts of 
procedural safeguards that are appropriate to determining 
facts relating to misconduct. Thus, the conclusion that a 
particular dismissal is academic -- that it entails these 
expert evaluations -- is likely to have controlling 
significance in determining how much and what sort of 
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New footnote 6. 
University faculties must have the widest range 
of discretion in making judgments as to the academic 
performance of students and their entitlement to promotion 
or graduation. Contrary to the suggestion of MR. JUSTICE 
MARSHALL, post, at 9 n. 18, the fact that a particular 
procedure is possible or available does not mean that it 
is required under the Due Process Clause. Goss v. Lopez, 
419 U.S. 565 (1975), simply does not speak to that point. 
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of thr "gf'lll'l':il topirl ~:i in th!' ('litTi(•t1lt1111 ,tl ,,,111 \I hi, ·h \l't ' :i n· ,,-kin!!: rt1w 
p,11wlJ to t,,·aluntl' ~-011r prrforrn:1111·1·. . I .\pp.:;, 1 _ 1-::,,·li m1 •111l,1·r of 
tlH' Pxamining panel 1,·;1~ rl'(JU<'~t1 ·1l t11 "t•Y:tlu:itt· 1l w 1·x11•111 ,,r I n·..:1ll111d,•111 ·, I 
nw~ter.,· of n·lt-,·ant ronN•pt~. k1101Ylt•dgt-. ~kill.- :ind ,·11mp<'ir-111·~- t11 1'1111<"1i1111 
;1., :i ph~·~iei:111.' ' ( .\pp .:{,) . Tlw Px:1 n1i11 :1li1111..: I,_, 11w111 l1c•r., ni' ,h,. p:111l'I 
wr rr c:ondurtrd .-;rp;1r,11<'1y. Two uf th e d1w10,- rc·1·0111n11 ·nd,·d 1h:i1 rr-
, I • 
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of these discussions and examinations ,ms on respondent's 
competency as a physician. 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL nevertlwlPss statPs that respond-
ent's dismissal was based "largely·· on "her coll(! uct' ' : 
"It may nevertheless be true. as the Court implies. ante, 
at 12 n. 6. that the school decided that respondent's 
inadequacies in such areas as personal hygiene. peer and 
patient relations. and timeliness would impair her ability 
to be 'a good tnedical doctor.' Whether these inade-
quacies can be termed 'pure academic reasons.' as the 
Court calls them. ibid., is ultimately an irrelevant ques-
tion, and one placing an undue emphasis 011 "·ords rather 
than functional considerations. The relevant point is that 
respondent was dismissed largely because of her conduct, 
just as the students ill Goss were suspended because of 
their conduct." Post, at 8 (emphasis added). 
This conclusion is explicitly contrary to the District Court's 
undisturbed findings of fact. In one sense, the term "conduct" 
could be used to embrace a poor academic performance as well 
as unsatisfactory personal conduct. But I do not understand 
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL to use the term in that undifferen-
tiated sense. 2 His opinion likens the dismissal of respondent 
spondent be graduated (althm1gh onP nddPd tlrnt "she would not qualify 
to intern at the hospital where br wurkP<I' ' ) . (App. 40) . .Ench of the other 
five doctors ,mbmitted negatin• recotnmenclntions, nlthough they varied ms 
to whether respondent should be cjrupped from ;.:chool immediate!~·. Ibid . 
2 Indeed, in view of \fa . J m;TrCE MAHSHALL '::; npparent conclusion that 
respondent was dismi~~ed becau~e of some objrctiwl~· determinable con-
duct, it is difficult to under::;tand his conrlu>'ion that the ::;pecia1 examination 
administered by the seven practicing ph~·~irians " may l11we been better 
than[] a form11l henring.'' Post . at 6. That Pxamination did not purport 
to determine whether, in the pa::s t, respondent had engaged in conduct that 
would warrant. di,;mis,m l. R e::spondent apparent!~· was not called upon to 
argue that ,;he had not done certain thing~ in the past. There were nu 
facts found on 1hnt point. Xor did the dortor,; who admini::;tered the 
examination addres;:; them:::clve:; to re::;11ondent.'s conduct at the time, apart 
" ~ . . 
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to the suspension of the students in Goss for personal misbe-
havior. There is evidence that respondent's personal conduct 
may have been viewed as eccentric, but--quite unlike the 
suspensions in Goss-respondent's dismissal was not based on 
her personal behavior.3 
The findings of the District Court conclusively shows that 
respondent was dismissed for failure to meet the academic 
standards of the medical school. The court, after reviewing 
the evidence in some detail. concluded: 
"The evidence presented in this case totally failed to 
establish that plaintiff [respondent] was expelled for any 
reason other than the quality of her work." (App. 44).4 
It is well to bear in mind that respondent was attending a 
medical school where competency in clinical courses is as much 
of a prerequisite to graduation as satisfactory grades in other 
courses. Respondent was dismissed because she was as defi-
from her ability to perform the clinical tasks physi,cin.ns must master. 
MR . .JusTICE MARSHALL says that thi,; <'Y:1luation tested the " truth" of the 
assertion,; that rp,;pondent could not function a,: n dortor. Post, at 7 n. 14. 
This i,; a tacit. rPcognition that the i;::.;:up wm, an acadC'mic one, rnther than 
one limited to whether responde11t :::imp!~· engagPd i11 improper conduct. 
3 Tlwre wns concern on the part of th<' facu lt~· a,: to rPspondent's· 
personal hygiPne, but the Distrirt Court nrnde clear thnt this was not the 
cause for her dismissal : 
With regard to plaintiff's physical appraranrr, tl1i,: in nnd of itself did not 
cause plaintiff to be evaluated nn~· differrntl~· tlian a n~- of the othe r 
students ; however, plaintiff's unkempt 11ppc·:1 ranee and condition were much 
cause for concern with both faculty nnd ~tudent ,:, and tl1is was brought to 
her attention on numerorn; occasions : hut ,;:he wa::; not t reate<l in any 
manner than an~· other ,;tudent with simit1 r ddiriencie,; would have been 
treated." (App. 45) . 
4 The District Court also found : 
"Considering all of the evidence prr~l'nt<'d, thP Court find,; that the grad-
ing and evaluating s~·8tem of the medic·:11 ,:ehool wa:- applied fairly and 
reasonably to pla.intiff, but plaintiff did not satisfy the requirement;, of the 
medical school to graduate from the medica l school in June 1973." (App. 
45) . 
a < L 
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cient in her clinical work as she was proficient in the "book-
]earning" portion of the curriculum." Evaluation of her 
performance in the former area is no less an "academic" 
judgment because it involves observation of her skills and 
techniques in actual conditions of practice, rather than assign-
ing a grade to her written answers on an essay question . 
Beca.use it is clear from the findings of fact by the District 
Court that respondent was dismissed solely on academic 
grounds, and because the standards of procedural due process 
wer~ abundantly met before dismissal occurred,° I join the 
Court's opinion. 
5 Dr. William Sirridge was the faculty membrr a~signrd to respondent 
as her " chief docent" (faculty ad,·isrr). A port ion of his testimony was 
summarized by the Di;;trict Court as follow1-1 : 
" He rDr. Sirridge] emphasized thnt plaintiff',-: rrc,spondent's] prnblem was 
that ~he thought she could lea rn to be a mrclical doctor by reading books, 
and he advised her [that] the clinical skills \\-ere equally m; important for 
obtaining the M . D. degree. He further testified that plaintiff cannot 
perform many of the necessa ry basic skills rrquired of a practicing 
physician; .... " (App. 35) . 
6 I agree with the Cou rt that uni,·e rsity faculties must have the widest 
range of di:;cretion in making judgments a,: to the academic performance 
of student;; and their entit lement to promotion or graduation. In terms of 
the process that. '' is due," there i:-: a ~ignificant distinction between a 
dismis,;al for academic reasons and clismi<'>'al for improper conduct. 
' 
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MR. JusTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I join the Court's opinion because I read it as upholding the 
District Court's view that respondent was dismissed for 
academic deficiencies rather than for unsatisfactory personal 
conduct, and that in these circumstances she was accorded due 
process. 
In the numerous meetings and discussions respondent had 
with her teachers and advisers, see opinion of MR. JusTICE 
MARSHALL, post, at 2- 3, culmrnating in the special clinical 
examination administered by seven physicians,' opinion of the 
Court, arnt e, at 3, respondent was warned of her clinical 
deficiencies and given every opportunity to demonstrate 
improvement or question the evaluations. The primary focus 
1 As a safeguard against erroneous judgment, and at. respondent's 
request App. 36, the Medical School submitted the question of respond-
ent's clinical competency to a panel of "seven experienced physicians." 
Panel members were requestrd " to provide a ca reful, detailed, and thorough 
assessment of [respondent 's] abilities at this time." App. 36. The 
Dean's letter to respondent of March 15, 1973 , advised her quite specifically 
of the ''general topic[s] in the curriculum abo ut whjcb we are asking [the 
panel] to evaluate your performance . .. . " App. 37. Each member of 
the examjning panel was reque;:;ted to ''evaluate the extent of [respondent's] 
mastery of relevant concepts, knowledge, ;;kills and competency to function 
as .a physician." App. 37. The examinations b~, members of the panel 
were conducted separately. Two of the doctors recommended that re-
✓ ... 
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of these discussions and examinations was on respondent's 
competence as a physician. 
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL nevertheless states that respond-
ent's dismissal Wl:1-S based "largely" on "her conduct": 
"It may nevertheless be true, as the Court implies, ante, 
at 12 n. 6, that the school decided that respondent's 
inadequacies in such areas as -personal hygiene, peer and 
patient relations. and timeliness would impair her ability 
to be 'a good medical doctor. ' Whether these inade-
quacies can be termed 'pure academic reasons,' as the 
Court calls them, ibid.; is ultimately an irrelevant ques-
tion. and one placing an undue emphasis on words rather 
than functional considerations. The relevant point is that 
respondent was dismissed largely because of her conduct, 
just as the students in Goss were suspended because of 
their conduct." Post, at 8 (emphasis added). 
This conclusion is explicitly contrary to the District Court's 
undisturbed findings of fact. In one sense, the term "conduct" 
could be used to embrace a poor academic performance as well 
as unsatisfactory personal conduct. But I do not understand 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL to use the term in that undifferen-
tiated sense.2 His opinion likens the dismissal of respondent 
spondent be graduated although one added that. "she would not qualify 
to intern at the hospital where he worked." App. 40. Each of the other 
five doctors submitted negat.ive recommendations, although they varied as 
to whether respondent should ·be dropped from school immediately. Ibid. 
2 Indeed, in view of MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL'S apparent conclusion th11,t 
respondent was dismissed because of some objectively qeterminable con-
duct, it is difficult to understand liis conclusion that the special examination 
administered by the seven practicing physicians "may have been better 
than[] a formal hearing." Post , at 6. That examination did not purport 
to detf.'rmine whether, in the past, respondent had engaged in conduct that 
would warrant dismissal. Respondent appa rently was not called upon to 
argue that she had not done certain things in the past. There were no 
facts foulld on that point. Nor did the doctors who administered the 
examina.tion address themselves to respondenfs conduct at the time, apart 
_, .. 
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to the suspension of the students in Goss for personal misbe-
havior. There is evidence that respondent's personal conduct 
may have been viewed as eccentric, but-quite unlike the 
suspensions in Goss_:.respondent's dismissal was not based on 
her personal behavior. 
The findings of the District Court conclusively shows that 
respondent was dismissed for failure to meet the academic 
standards of the medical school. The court, after reviewing 
the evidence in some detail , concluded: 
"The evidence presented in this case totally failed to 
establish that plaintiff [respondent] was expelled for any 
reason other than the quality of her work." (App. 44) .3 
It is well to bear in mind that respondent was attending a 
medical school where competence in clinical courses is as much 
of a prerequisite to graduation as satisfactory grades in other 
courses. Respondent was dismissed because she was as defi-
cient in her clinical work as she was proficient in the "book-
learning" portion of tl1e curriculum.4 Evaluation of her 
from her ability to perf arm the clinical tasks physicians must master. 
MR. Jus'l'!CE MARSHALL says that this eva luat ion tested the truth of the 
assert ions t hat respondent cottld qot function as a doctor. Post, at 7 n . 14. 
This is a tacit recognition that the issue was an academic one, rather than 
one limited to whether respondent simply engaged in improper conduct. 
3 The Di:strict Court. also found: 
"Considering all of the evidence presented, the Court, finds that the grad-
ing and evaluating system of the medical school was applied fai rly and 
reasonably to p laint.iff, but plaintiff did not satisfy t he requirements of t he 
medical school to graduate from the medical school in June 1973." App. 
4~. 
4 Dr. William Si rridge was the faculty member assigned to respondent 
as her "chief docent" (faculty adviser). A portion of his testimony was 
summarized by the Di8trict Court as follows: 
"He [Dr. Si rridge] emphasized that plaintiff's [respondent's] problem was 
that she thought she could learn to be a medical doctor by reading books, 
and he advised h€r [that] t he clinical skills were equally as important for 
obtaining the M. D. degree. He further testified tha.t plaintiff cannot 
,~ 
'\ 
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performance in the former area is no less an "academic" 
judgment because it involves observation of her skills and 
techniques in actual conditions of practice, rather than assign-
ing a grade to her written answers on a.n essay question. 5 
Because it is clear from the findings of fact by the District 
Court that respondent was dismissed solely on academic 
grounds, and because the standards of procedural due process 
were abundantly met before dismissal occurred," I join the 
Court's opinion. 
perform many of the necessary basic skills required of a practicing 
physician .... " App. 35. 
5 MR. Jus'!'ICE MARSHALL insists that calling this an academic judgment 
is an exercise in futility. Post. at 8 n. 18. As the Court points out, 
however, the distinction between dismissa l~ for academic deficiency and 
dismissal for misconduct may be decisive as to the proce~s that is due. 
Ante, at 11. A decision relating to the misconduct of a student. requires a 
factual determination whether the conduct took place or not. The accuracy 
of that determination can be safeguarded b~· the sorts of procedural 
protectio1is traditionally imposed under the Due Process Clause. An 
academic judgment also involves this type of objectively determinable 
fact-e. g., whether the student gave certain answers on an examination. 
But the critical decision requires a subjective, expert evaluation as to 
whether that performance sa tisfies ~ome predetermined standard of aca-
demic competence. That standard, in turn, is set by a. similarly expert 
judgment . These evaluations, which go far beyond questions of mere 
"conduct ," are not susceptible to the same sorts of procedural safeguards 
that are appropriate to determining facts relating to misconduct. Thus, 
the conclusion that a particular dismissal is academic-that it entails these 
expert evaluations-is likely to have controlling significance in determining 
how much and what sort of process is due. 
6 University faculties must. qave the widest range of discretion in making 
judgments as to the academic performance of students and their entitle-
ment to promotion or graduation. Contrary to the suggestion of MR. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL, post, at 9 n. t8, tbe fact that. a particular procedure is 
possible or ava ilable does not II\ean tha.t it is required under the Due 
Process Clause. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (19'75), simply does not 
speak to that point. 
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